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Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego (MCRDSD), one of two 
Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRD), is responsible for training 
all recruits originating from recruiting stations (RS) west of 
the Mississippi River.  Unlike its sister depot, MCRD Parris 
Island on the east coast, MCRD, San Diego conducts recruit 
training at two Marine bases 30 miles apart.  The majority of 
the training is conducted aboard the recruit depot located in 
the heart of downtown San Diego.  However, due to the 
restrictions placed upon the San Diego depot concerning acreage 
available for field training and field firing, MCRDSD must 
temporarily relocate recruit training to Edson Range, MCB Camp 
Pendleton for four weeks each training cycle.  Here the recruits 
complete critical training requirements to include field 
training, qualifying with the M-16 A2 service rifle and the 
final exercise, the Crucible.  In addition to the responsibility 
of training one half of the Corps 38,000 recruits each year, 
MCRDSD is also responsible for the Western Recruiting Region 
(WRR) headquartered aboard the Depot. 
This study examines recruit training at MCRDSD from an 
organizational systems perspective1.  A system: is composed of 
parts; has relations; has a boundary; generates emergent 
properties; and has a common purpose or outcome2.  Even though 
MCRDSD may be generating some of the best, basically trained 
war-fighters in the U.S. arsenal, this study analyzes the extent 
to which all the critical components of recruit training fit 
                                                 
1 Bryson, J., Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit organizations, 
Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 1995. and Senge, P., The Fifth Discipline: The 
Art and Practice of The Learning Organization, Currency-Doubleday, 1990.  
2 Prof. Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
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together as a system.  The purpose is to assist Marine Corps 
leaders and managers in ways to improve recruit training. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis combined literature 
review, on-site semi-structured interviews, and comparison to 
accepted theoretical frameworks of organizational performance.  
A review of relevant literature relating to organizational and 
systems analysis, systems theory, including Mintzberg’s 
structural configuration theory was conducted to provide the 
theoretical foundation for analyzing recruit training.  A review 
of literature, briefs and documents provided by MCRDSD was 
conducted in order to describe the organizational structure and 
missions of the depot and subordinate commands prior to an 
onsite visit and interviews.  Additional data were obtained 
based on an onsite visit to MCRDSD, for observation of 
daily/routine operations, and 30 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with depot personnel ranging from the commanding 
general to drill instructors.  Two theoretical models were used 
to describe and analyze recruit training – systems model and 
Mintzberg’s configurations model.  Both models contain all the 
important variables for determining the extent to which an 
organization fits with its external environment and produces 
desired results. 
C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
This study examines recruit training in terms of how its 
present organizational environment, structure, processes and 
culture are aligned with the depots primary mission of 
converting civilians into top-notch, basic trained Marines.  
This study can be used by Marine Corps leaders, planners, 
managers, and Drill Instructor’s to modify certain aspects of 
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recruit training to improve training efficiency and end results.  
Findings indicate that some components are not in alignment with 
the depots mission. Recommendations are made to highlight 
opportunities for increased cooperation and flexibility between 
recruit trainers and civilian run aspects of recruit training, 
including restructuring the Recruit Training Regiment, and the 
creation of a Deputy CG billet to allow the CG to focus on depot 
priorities. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 The data used in this thesis was collected through the 
conduct of only 30 interviews with depot personnel across the 
spectrum of the command, review of depot literature, command and 
visitor briefs, and the author’s personal experiences in recruit 
training.  This research has been limited to training operations 
at MCRD, San Diego only, and does not address or reflect that of 
MCRD, Parris Island.  This was necessary in that MCRD, Parris 
Island is a centralized recruit training environment and 
involves significant training and logistical differences and 
considerations from that of MCRD, San Diego.   The analysis is 
limited to a qualitative study only; no attempt was made to 
quantify the effect that any areas determined to be not in 
alignment with the depots primary mission are in terms of time 
or fiscal resources.  The scope of this study is limited to an 
analysis of those agencies and units directly related to the 
recruit training mission, and does not take into account other 
subordinate commands and tenant activities co-located aboard the 
base.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
 The primary research question of this thesis contains two 
basic parts: (1) What are the system components comprising 
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recruit training at MCRD San Diego (e.g. Environmental context, 
organizational design structure and processes, and results)?  
And (2) To what extent do the critical components fit together 
to produce an optimal system for training basically-trained 
Marines.  Chapter II discusses the systems and Mintzberg’s 
frameworks.   Chapter III provides an overview of the 
organizational structure of MCRDSD.  Chapter IV provides an 
overview of the recruit training process at MCRDSD.  Chapter V 
analyzes recruit training at San Diego using the theoretical 
frameworks, and Chapter VI draws conclusions and makes 
recommendations for improvements.   
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY AND MODELS 
 This chapter describes the analytical tools used to conduct 
the analysis outlined in Chapters V and VI.  The first tool is 
the systems model that looks at an organization from a 
holistic3, open system approach.  A system is a set of inter-
related and interdependent components having a common purpose.  
The hypothesis is that the extent to which important 
organizational input, throughput, and results variables fit, or 
are in congruence, then performance is better.  Congruence is 
defined as “the degree to which the needs, demands, goals, 
objectives, and/or structures of one component are consistent 
with the needs, demands, goals objectives, and/or structures of 
another component”4.  The second model used is based on 
Mintzberg’s theory of configuration, which suggests an 
organizations structure is based upon the configuration of its 
core attributes5.   
A. SYSTEMS MODEL  
The systems model shown Figure 1 is an adaptation of Prof. 
Roberts’6 Organizational Framework design and views an 
organizational systems framework in terms of its inputs, 
throughputs and results.  Each of these in turn consists of 
various interrelated attributes (external environment, people, 
structure, technology, culture, etc.) that interact with each 
                                                 
3. Heylighen, F., Basic Concepts of the Systems Approach, Principia 
Cybernetica, 1998. p.1. 
4 Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael L., Organization, Congruence, and 
Effectiveness: A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior: Applying a 
Congruence Perspective, Organizational Dynamics, 1980. p. 100. 
5 Mintzberg, Henry, Mintzberg on Management, The Free Press: New York, 
1989.  
6 Dr. Nancy Roberts, “The Systems Model”, Naval Postgraduate School, 
unpublished, 1998 
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other whereby a change in one will impact upon the others and 
vice-versa.  The extent of fit, or congruence with the 
organizations goals is a determining factor in an organizations 
success.  This model will be instrumental in the analysis of 
MCRD, San Diego.  For example, inputs equate primarily to 
civilian recruits, among other external and internal factors.  A 
throughput would be the recruit training process, outputs are 
the number of recruits completing training, and outcomes include 




According to Nadler and Tushman, inputs consist of 
those resources or materials that an organization has to work 
with.  These are referred to as the “givens” facing an 
organization7.  These givens include the environmental factors, 
resources and history of the organization.  The first of three 
main elements considered as inputs are those that impact the 
organization that are external to the organization itself.  They 
are most notably the political, economic, social and 
technological influences that comprise the environment the 
organization exists within.  They combine to create the demands, 
constraints and opportunities that shape the decisions of the 
command and to a large degree also determine the resources 
available to the organization.  They range from markets and 
suppliers to competitors and the economy8. 
                                                 
7Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael L., Organization, Congruence, and 
Effectiveness: A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior: Applying a 
Congruence Perspective, Organizational Dynamics, 1980. p. 95.  
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system as they are
expressed in behavior?
¾How is conflict managed?






¾Does the culture(s) 
fit the larger environment?
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¾What are the basic tasks?
How formalized?





¾How can the work flow be
described?
¾What are the activities in the
work flow?
¾What are the key inter-
dependencies among the
work units or activities in
the work flow?
¾What is the condition of the
physical facilities and equipment?
STRUCTURE 
¾How to describe the structure?
¾What are the basic groupings of
activities and people?  How are 
activities/tasks combined?
Departmentalized?
¾How are the groupings integrated?








¾Who are the people? Motives, expectations, mindsets?
¾What are their knowledge, skills and abilities?
PROCESS/SUBSYSTEMS
¾Financial Management, Measurement &Controls?
-How are people held accountable for resources?
Describe:  budgeting, control, performance
measurement, performance appraisal processes.
-Do these mechanisms of accountability produce the
desired patterns of behavior?
¾Human Resource Management
-How do we recruit, select, retain, rotate, promote,
Terminate, retire our people?  Do we have the kind of
People we need?
-How do we train and develop people and are our
current efforts adequate?  Describe: OJT, formal
training programs, team building or other 
organizational development activities, career
development.
- What is formally rewarded (both positive and 
negative rewards)?  What is the basic compensation 
package:  bonus & commissions, opportunities for
advancement, recognition & praise?  Are rewards
tied to performance assessment?
¾Communication Information Planning and Decision 
Making
- How do we communicate?
- How do we gather, process, distribute and evaluate
Information?
- How do we plan?
-How do we make decisions?





Professor Nancy Roberts 1/2000
     Source:From Roberts (1998)9 




                                                 
9  Dr. Nancy Roberts, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 1998. 
The other two factors to consider when identifying the 
environmental and contextual factors related to an organization 
are the Resources and History of that organization.  Resources 
refer to the different assets available to an organization in 
the form of labor, technology, capital and information.  Two 
concerns regarding the use of these resources is the 
organizations degree of access to the resources needed and their 
pliability towards the organizations goals, purpose or 
mission10.  History implies that the way an organization acts, 
reacts or makes decisions is due in large part to the manner in 
which they have conducted themselves in the past11.  History in 
large complex machine bureaucracies (military services) is 
deeply ingrained and often slow to change.  
b. Key Success Factors 
What does it take for an organization to be 
successful?  This can be dependent upon the organization’s 
managerial priorities and they can differ between organizations 
competing within the same industry, existing in similar 
contexts, and can change from year to year.  Though they are 
commonly similar between organizations competing in similar 
industries, they in turn can vary significantly between 
different industries.  A key success factor concerning recruit 
training might be the ability of drill instructors to 
successfully transform civilians into trained Marines. 
c. System Direction 
Critical to the success of an organization is the 
direction, guidance, goals, strategic vision and mission 
accomplishment identified and obtained by senior leaders.  Of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 95. 
11 Ibid. 
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these, strategy may be the most critical as it defines how the 
organization is going to compete within its industry, conduct 
itself within the marketplace, and obtain its quantifiable 
objectives12.  System direction also includes any organizational 
mandates, principles or espoused values administered.  System 
direction includes to the method and type of guidance 
articulated by the leadership. 
2. Design Factors 
Design factors refer to the throughputs or the 
transformation process whereby inputs are acted upon to yield 
desired results13.  Design factors include structural (decision 
making) and process variables as well as tasking and technology 
used to accomplish the work.  Again, relative congruence among 
pairs of design variables impacts performance.  For instance, 
the greater the fit between how decisions are made and the 
reward process, the greater the likelihood of obtaining the 
desired results.  An example related to recruit training would 
predict the extent to which recruits are rewarded (or punished) 
fits desired behavior (decisions), and training is enhanced.  
a. Tasks 
Tasks are the actual work being done by the 
organization or the type of work the organization is involved 
in.  Analysis begins with defining the critical tasks and 
functions that need to be conducted in order for the 
organization to accomplish its goals.  Analysis would includes 
describing the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities (KSA) 
necessary to complete the tasks, and the constraints and 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 97. 
13Verstraete, Anthony A., Systems Approach and the I-P-O-Model, downloaded 
from http://www.smeal.psu.edu/misweb/systems/sycoipo.html, 10/22/2002.  
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restraints inherent in the workplace.  Notably, the congruence 
among other components depends in large part on an in-depth 
understanding of the nature of the tasks to be performed14. 
b. Technology 
Technology refers to the workflow.  How can it be 
described?  Is it linear or are several functions performed 
simultaneously that contribute to the production of the same 
product?  Technology also includes the key interdependencies 
among the work groups or activities being performed and the 
condition of the physical facilities and equipment.  It does not 
account for information systems, often thought to be included in 
this component. 
c. Structure 
Structure refers to the basic groupings of activities 
and people and the relationship between these activities and 
core tasks, but also includes how decisions are made.  For 
example, are they centralized or decentralized, and are teams 
used to make decisions?  Also considered is how integrating 
devices are used such as hierarchy, task forces, integrating 
roles, integrating departments, matrix and network arrangements. 
d. People 
This factor describes the number, characteristics, 
motivations, expectations and experiences of the employee 
workforce.  Who are they?  What is their demographic make-up? 
What are their initial KSA’s?  This information can assist in 
understanding the individual and group behavior of the 
                                                 
14Nadler, David A. and Tushman, Michael L., Organization, Congruence, and 
Effectiveness: A Model for Diagnosing Organizational Behavior: Applying a 
Congruence Perspective, Organizational Dynamics, 1980. p. 98. 
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workforce. New recruits are of course a reflection of Americas 
changing generations, e.g., Gen-X and millennials. 
e. Process/Subsystems 
This design factor addresses: 
1. Financial Management, Measurement and Controls: 
This includes measures of accountability for resources, 
budgeting and performance appraisal measurements and processes.  
The idea is to discern if the mechanisms in place are producing 
or inhibiting the desired patterns of behavior. 
2. Human Resources Management (HRM): HRM manages 
personnel polices to ensure it has the right amount of people, 
with the right skills, in the right jobs, to meet the needs of 
the organization.  Initial analysis focuses on if the right 
people are being recruited, selected, retained, promoted and 
terminated.  Are the organizations training programs adequate?  
Lastly, there is a need to focus on the rewards process.  Is the 
organization’s reward system effective in aligning the goals of 
the employee with the goals of the organization?   
3. Communication Information Planning and Decision 
Making: This process deals with how an organization 
communicates, gathers, processes, distributes and evaluates 
information.  This design factor addresses the organization’s 
information systems mentioned earlier. 
4. Acquisition and Contracting: This examines how an 
organization manages the acquisition and contracting process. 
3. Results 
Results refers to three primary attributes of the systems 
model: culture, outputs and outcomes.  These attributes are 
resultant of the ongoing transformation of inputs in the 
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organizations attempt to realize its goals and objectives.  They 
encompass both the intended and unintended consequences of the 
system as a whole. 
a. Culture 
Culture is defined in many ways.  For instance, 
culture is the “invisible force behind the tangibles and 
observables in an organization, a social energy that moves the 
membership into action”15, as a “shared pattern of basic 
assumptions that a group learned as it solved its problems of 
external adaptation and integration, that has worked well enough 
to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members 
as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems16”.  Culture is more simply, “the way we do 
things around here17.”  In the conduct of the analysis it is 
important to determine the extent to which culture and 
subcultures impede or facilitate integration of effort within 
the organization.  Culture is an emergent variable important to 
recruit training.  In short, an incoming, diverse mix of 
civilian cultures has to be molded into the unique, warrior 
culture of basic trained Marines. 
b. Outputs 
Output is what the organization produces in terms of 
goods and services and is typically a measure of organizational 
performance and effectiveness.  It is a measure of how well the 
organization meets its objectives, utilizes its resources and 
adapts to a changing environment18.  In the case of MCRDSD an 
                                                 
15 Mohrman, Allan M., et. al., Large Scale Organizational Change, Jossey – 
Bass, San Francisco, 1989. 
16 Bolman, Lee G., Deal, Terrence E., Reframing Organizations, Jossey-Bass, 
San Francisco, 1997 
17 Ibid. 
18 Nadler and Tushman, p. 97. 
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output would be the quantity and quality of the basically 
trained Marines, including factors such as time to complete 
training and the number of failures. 
c. Outcomes 
Outcomes are the implications and consequences of the 
outputs.  Outcomes generate feedback both into an organizations 
input and direction, and into the external environment, i.e., 
perceptions of well-trained, basic Marines.  This feedback loop 
allows the organization to change and manipulate its design 
factors to improve future outputs and outcomes. 
B. MINTZBERG’S THEORY 
Mintzberg’s theory states that an organization’s success 
should not rely solely upon one theme for success (such as a 
particular strategy or product), but more on the 
interrelationship of its various attributes.  Thus, there is not 
just “one best way”, but there can be many ways for an 
organization to realize success via the configuration of key 
attributes19.  The interrelationship and size of core attributes 
can define the configuration of an organization.  
Figure 220 is a diagram of Mintzberg’s model and an 
organizations six core attributes as he envisions them.  At its 
base is the operating core consisting of those workers 
(operators) who perform the rudimentary functions, labor, 
services and tasks of the organization.  At the top of the 
organizational model lies the strategic apex where the whole 
system is overseen by senior level management ensuring 
effectiveness, oversight, and direction over the entire system.  
As organizations grow, they will require more managers, not just 
                                                 
19  Mintzberg, p.95 
20  Ibid., p. 99. 
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due to the larger work force within the operating core, but also 
of other mid-line managers.  These managers become the link 
between the strategic apex and the operating core and are 
referred to as the middle line.  Organizations also require 
analysts who perform necessary support functions such as the 
designing, training, planning and controlling the work of 
others.  These analysts make up the technostructure of the 
organization.  On the right of the model, the support staff 
provides the administrative, legal and other support necessary 
to allow the organization to accomplish its mission.  Lastly is 
ideology, or culture, which encompasses the entire model.  
Mintzberg defines ideology as the “traditions and beliefs of an 
organization that distinguish it from other organizations and 
infuse a certain life into the skeleton of its structure”.21 
Mintzberg’s model takes shape with a small strategic apex 
connected by a flaring middle-line to a large, flat operating 
core at the base.  These three parts of the organization are 
drawn in one uninterrupted sequence to indicate that they are 
typically connected through a single chain of formal authority.  
The technostructure and the support staff are shown off to 
either side, to indicate that they are separate from this main 
line of authority, influencing the operating core indirectly.  
The ideology is shown as a kind of halo that surrounds the 
entire system.22 
Mintzberg goes on to define the structure of an 
organization as ways in which labor is divided into distinct 
tasks and how coordination among them is achieved.  These 
coordinating measures are considered to be the “glue” that holds 
                                                 
21 Mintzberg, p.98. 











          Source: From Mintzberg (1989) 
Figure 2. Mintzburg’s Model 
an organization together.  Mintzberg outlines six ways in which 
organizations can coordinate their work.23 
1. Mutual adjustment, coordinates via the process of 
informal communication between operating employees. 
2. Direct supervision, whereby one person issues orders 
or instructions to a group of subordinates whose work 
interrelates and for which he is responsible. 
3. Standardization of work processes, usually coming out 
of the technostructure, they achieve coordination by 
standardizing the work processes of those carrying out 
interrelated tasks. 
 15
                                                 
23 Mintzberg, p. 101. 
4. Standardization of outputs, again originating from 
within the technostructure, these achieve coordination by 
standardizing the results of outputs such as product or 
performance specifications. 
5. Standardization of skills (and knowledge), coordinates 
work by the specific training the workers have received such as 
doctors, engineers or lawyers. 
6. Standardization of norms, controls the norms of the 
workforce so that everyone has the same set of beliefs within 
the organization. 
How these coordinating measures interrelate is a function 
of the size and industry in which the organization exists.  The 
typical progression of means of coordination begins with the 
simplest mechanism, mutual adjustment.  As organizations become 
more complex their primary means of coordination will transition 
to direct supervision and then standardization (of work, 
outputs, skills and norms).24 
Coordination also takes place laterally and vertically.  
Lateral forms of coordination are typically less formal 
(meetings, task forces, coordinating roles), more flexible, and 
more effective than vertical methods25. Vertical methods of 
coordination are typical of the hierarchal chain of authority 
whereby those at the top control the work of their subordinates 
via rules, policies, and planning and control systems.26  
Organizations operating in turbulent and rapidly changing 
environments require more flexible systems and would emphasize 
lateral coordination vice organizations existing in more steady 
and stable environments that rely more on centralized and 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 Bolman and Deal, p. 44. 
26 Bolamn and Deal, p. 42. 
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authoritative means of coordination typical of the vertical 
method.27 
Mintzberg has identified six different types of basic 
configurations that cover the spectrum of basic organizational 
structures.  The configuration of an organization is dependent 
upon the context the organization resides in.  This context, 
taking into account external and internal factors, will favor 
one or more attributes over others, making them dominant.  The 
push or pull effect of these dominating attributes gives an 
organization its shape, or in this case, its configuration.  
Table 1 summarizes these configurations. 





















Operating Core Horizontal 
Diversified Standardization 
of Outputs 
Middle Line Limited Vertical 
Innovative Mutual 
Adjustment 








                                                 
27 Bolman and Deal, p. 57. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, SAN DIEGO 
A. BACKGROUND 
The overarching purpose of the United States Marine Corps 
is to make Marines and win our nations battles29.  While many 
thousands of Marines are deployed world wide to ensure the 
safety and security of our nation and our allies, the process of 
making Marines is centralized aboard two depots on opposite 
coasts of the United States.  MCRD, Parris Island on the east 
coast is responsible for training all recruits originating from 
states east of the Mississippi River and MCRD, San Diego on the 
west coast is responsible for training all recruits originating 
from west of the Mississippi River.  MCRD, San Diego was 
originally founded in 1919, through the combined efforts of 
Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton and Congressman William Kettner, to 
serve as an expeditionary base for Pendelton’s Fourth 
Provisional Marine Regiment.  In addition to serving as an 
expeditionary base, the Marine Corps began to train recruits in 
San Diego in 1923.  The primary mission of the depot converted 
solely to recruit training during WW II where over 200,000 
recruits were trained.  Today, MCRD, San Diego trains 
approximately one-half of the Corps 38,000 recruits each year. 
Though the two depots share similar missions they differ 
notably in two significant respects. First, MCRD, Parris Island 
is a centralized recruit training facility in that it conducts 
every aspect of recruit training aboard its own depot while 
MCRD, San Diego is geographically separated.  Due to the 
constraints bought on by its urban location, MCRD, San Diego is 
restricted as to the type of training conducted.  Therefore, in 
order to complete all phases of recruit training, MCRD, San 
                                                 
29  General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, United States Marine Corps, 1996. 
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Diego must temporarily relocate recruit training for four weeks 
each training cycle 30 miles north to Edson Range, MCB, Camp 
Pendleton.  Here, all field and weapons training is conducted 
including Crucible training.  Secondly, all female recruits in 
the Marine Corps are trained aboard MCRD, Parris Island.  This 
is due to the fact that there are not enough females recruited 
annually to justify the expenditures of training them on both 
coasts.  Beyond these two distinctions, depot structure and 
operations are quite similar.  The material presented in this 
chapter is drawn heavily from DepO 5450.4L 
B. MISSION 
The Commanding General (CG) of MCRD, San Diego has three 
overarching responsibilities.  The two most notable are: CG of 
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, entailing oversight of the recruit 
training process, and the CG Western Recruiting Region, 
entailing oversight of the recruiting process.  Additionally, he 
is the CG of the base facilities, and unlike other Base CG’s 
that report to a higher, on-site commander, he reports directly 
to Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) in this capacity.  The two 
former responsibilities provide the CG with two complementing 
mission statements: 
Provide reception, processing, and recruit training for 
male enlistees upon their initial entry into the Marine 
Corps; provide schools for training officers and 
enlisted Marines entrusted with the training of 
recruits; conduct other schools as directed; provide 
rifle and pistol marksmanship training for Marines 
stationed in the Southwest and for members of other 
services, as requested; and conduct training for Marine 
Reserves, as directed.  
 
As headquarters of the Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command’s Western Recruiting Region, exercise 
operational control of the enlisted recruiting 
operations in the 8th, 9th, and 12th Marine Corps 
Districts, through guidance and direction on quality 
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control matters for all enlisted accessions in 
accordance with standards established by the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps (CMC).30  
 
Since the CG of MCRD, San Diego is responsible of both 
recruiting and recruit training, he is afforded the unique 
opportunity to ensure seamless continuity between the quality of 
individual coming in, and emerging from the transformation 
process of recruit training in that one process feeds the other. 
 
C. STRUCTURE AND TASKS 
MCRD, San Diego is organized into four major command 
elements, augmented by numerous subordinate commands and tenant 
activities.  The four major command elements are the Recruit 
Training Regiment (RTR), Headquarters and Service Battalion (H&S 
Bn), Weapons and Field Training Battalion (WFTBn), and 
Headquarters, Western Recruiting Region (WRR).  Figure 3 is an 
overview of the organizational structure of MCRD, San Diego 
listing all supporting activities and tenant commands under the 
chief of staff.  This paper focuses primarily on those elements 
of depot structure that pertain to the recruit training process. 
1. Recruit Training Regiment 
RTR is charged with carrying out the primary mission of the 
depot to make Marines.  RTR’s mission statement is to: 
Provide reception processing, and recruit training for 
male enlisted personnel following initial entry into 
the Marine Corps; conduct training for reserve Marines 
as directed; exercise military command over Regimental 
Headquarters and all Marines, Sailors, civilians and 
Marine recruits assigned to the Recruit Training 
Regiment. 
The intent of the mission is to produce, after twelve 
weeks, a basically trained United States Marine embodied with  
 21
                                                 





































































































Figure 3. MCRDSD Organizational structure31 
the fighting spirit that has ensured the Corps success since its 
inception in 1776.  RTR consists of four major command elements: 
(Figure 4) three Recruit Training Battalions (RTBn), 1st, 2nd, 
and 3rd respectively, and Support Battalion.  The Recruit 
training Battalions are charged with the task of carrying out 
the specific training requirements as much as in executing the 
training schedule and transforming the recruits into Marines.  
And throughout the conduct of such, Support Battalion provides 
all the support necessary for the RTBn’s to accomplish their 
mission.  These four subordinate commands receive their guidance 
from the Regimental Headquarters Company staff that double as 
the liaison between the recruit trainers and further supporting 
agencies existing at the depot level. The Regimental 
Headquarters staff consists primarily of the following three  
 23
                                                 








































































































Figure 4. RTR Organizational structure32 
Staff sections.  The Adjutant/Personnel (S-1) Office is 
responsible for coordinating with other staff sections and 
supervising all the Regiment’s general administrative functions 
 24
                                                 
32 MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L 
pertaining to Marines, Sailors and recruits.  S-1 also 
coordinates all collateral duty assignments within the Regiment 
and conducts the career planning efforts on behalf of the 
Marines of the Regiment.  The Training (S-3) Office is 
responsible for conduct and supervision of all aspects of 
operations and training within the Regiment.  The S-3 has 
cognizance over recruit training.  The Logistics (S-4) Office is 
responsible for logistical functions within the Regiment to 
include oversight of inventories, controls and issues all 
equipment and supplies.  The S-4 also manages the messing, 
medical, dental, safety and maintenance of all personnel and 
facilities within the Regiment.  The Chaplain provides for the 
welfare of both the recruits and permanent personnel through the 
conduct of religious programs, counseling and working to improve 
morale. 
a. Recruit Training Battalion   
A Recruit Training Battalion’s primary responsibility 
is the conduct and execution of the 12-week recruit training 
schedule and ensuring a successful transformation process of a 
civilian to a Marine.  Their organizational structure, as 
depicted in Figure 5, consists of a headquarters staff and four 
recruit training companies.  The headquarters staff is 
responsible for all coordination of training, the resolving of 
any training issues and acting as the liaison to Support 
Battalion and Regiment as necessary, in order to optimize the 
drill instructors ability to train recruits and execute the 
training schedule.  This includes the training officer (S-3) 
responsible for monitoring training and ensuring compliance with 
the training Standard Operations Procedure (SOP), an 
Administration Chief (S-1) responsible for all recruit and 
permanent personnel administrative matters, an (S-4) to 
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coordinate all logistical matters, and a battalion Chaplain 
responsible for morale, coordinating all religious functions and 
the counseling of recruits.  
A recruit training company is organized into two series, lead 
and trail (which is also referred to as “follow”), Figure 5. 

























consisting of three to four recruit training platoons as shown 
in Figure 6.  A company also has a small headquarters staff 
consisting of a Company Executive Officer, a Company First 
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33MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L  
Sergeant and an Operations Clerk for the purpose of supervising 
and coordinating all functions of the company, and acting as a 
liaison to higher and outside agencies on behalf of the recruit 
training platoons.  A typical recruit training platoon consists 
of three to five Drill Instructors and 50-80 or more recruits.  
It is here where the recruit will spend 12 weeks aboard the 
Depot seemingly isolated and concurrently insulated from the 
everyday activities of the depot. 



























b. Support Battalion 
The mission of Support Battalion is to provide 
specialized training to Marine recruits, provide specialized 
support to the Marines and recruits of the Recruit Training 
Regiment, and operate the Drill Instructor School.  The 
Commanding Officer of Support Battalion has cognizance over the 
 27
Headquarters staff, Receiving Company, Instructional Training 
Company (ITC), Special Training Company (STC), and the Drill 
Instructor School.  See Figure 7.  
The headquarters staff of Support Battalion is not unlike 
that of a Recruit Training Battalion.  The Adjutants office (S-
1) coordinates all administrative matters, the Operations Office 
(S-3) coordinates all planning and training matters, and the 
Logistics Office (S-4) coordinates all logistical matters in the 
battalion.  Battalion staff also includes a Chaplains office 
responsible for the spiritual well being of battalion and 
recruit personnel to include providing for their welfare. 
Receiving Company receives and conducts the initial 
processing of all recruits arriving aboard the Depot.  Here they 
will remain for three to five days to ensure that all the 
recruits are properly medically and administratively processed 
prior to beginning training, that all recruits are assigned to 
their respective training companies, and that the health, 
comfort, and welfare of recruits awaiting separation is provided 
for. 
Instructional Training Company conducts a vast array of 
training in support of RTR and the depot.  ITC’s primary 
responsibilities are in the training and evaluation of recruits 
combat water survival (CWS), close combat instruction (CCI) and 
academic instruction.  ITC is responsible for developing all 
lesson plans, examination and tests used in the course of the 
academic portion of the training.  ITC also supports training 
for depot personnel in the areas of CWS and CCI instruction and 
qualification. 
Special Training Company is set up to support recruits who 
for either physical limitation or medical condition are not 
capable of continuing in the normal recruit training pipeline.  
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Consisting of three subordinate platoons, Medical Rehabilitation 
Platoon (MRP), Physical Conditioning Platoon (PCP), and Basic 
Marine Platoon (BMP), STC ensure recruits achieve appropriate 
health and fitness levels prior to returning to either recruit 
training, separations platoon or rehabilitation prior to 















































Figure 7. SPPT. Bn. Organizational structure 34 
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34MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L  
The Drill Instructor School is perhaps the most 
important function of Support Battalion.  Both the CG and the 
RTR CO belief the crux of their success in the recruit 
transformation process lies in the DI Schools ability to train 
and prepare the best Drill Instructors possible.  In addition to 
providing 11 intense weeks of instruction to DI’s in the proper 
technique and practices they will need in order to perform their 
duties and responsibilities, DI School also trains and educates 
newly joined company officers on the recruit training process 
and the environment via the Series Officer Course (SOC). 
2. Headquarters and Service Battalion 
The mission of Headquarters and Service battalion (H&S BN) 
is to provide technical direction, staff cognizance, and 
supervision of Headquarters and Service Battalion functions and 
provide administrative support for personnel assigned to the 
Battalion, the Recruiter School, the Marine Corps detachments, 
and transients within the San Diego area.  The Commanding 
Officer is a General Staff Officer exercising authority over the 
Battalion Headquarters staff, Headquarters Company, and Service 
Company (See Figure 8).  H&S Battalion Headquarters Staff is 
similar to that of RTBN and Support Battalion.  It possesses 
administrative, operations, logistics, and chaplain’s offices 
that support all activities aboard the Depot that do not warrant 
their own higher headquarters.  The Headquarters Company and 
Service Company together provide personnel support for permanent 
personnel in the area of administration, training, discipline, 






















Figure 8. H&S BN Organizational structure35 
3. Weapons & Field Training Battalion 
The mission of Weapons and Field Training Battalion (WFTBN) 
is to provide instruction to recruits in accordance with the 
Program of Instruction (POI) for recruit training in rifle 
marksmanship and combat field training, conduct re-qualification 
firing for permanent personnel based in the San Diego area, 
conduct schools to train selected personnel in the methods and 
procedures of marksmanship instruction, and to provide field 
medical services for recruits undergoing combat field training.  
WFTBN is located aboard Camp Pendleton (CPEN) at Edson Range and 
its organizational structure is depicted in Figure 9.  Beyond 
the similar staff array and functions of fellow subordinate 
commands, WFTBN has two unique training companies that carry out 
its primary mission in support of the recruit training process.   
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Figure 9. WFTBN Organizational structure36 
The first is Range Company.  Range Company conducts phase I and 
                                                
II entry level marksmanship training for recruits, pre-
qualification marksmanship instruction, as well as rifle and 
pistol sustainment training for permanent personnel of CAMPEN, 
WFTBN, the Depot, and other San Diego area units.  Range Company 
 32
 
36 Adaptation from MCRDSD DepO P5450.4L  
also supervises and manages target manufacturing and supply 
operations.  The Field and Weapons Training Company is the other 
“long pole in the tent” in support of recruit training.  It 
conducts basic entry-level infantry and field marksmanship 
(Phase III) for recruits during Field Firing training.  This 
company also provides the primary instructors for the conduct of 
Basic Warrior Training (BWT).  It also is responsible for 
maintaining supplies and equipment for support training, and 
provides subject matter expertise for the conduct of the 
Crucible event to recruit training companies and the DI School.  
And lastly, the Field & Weapons Training Company provides 
support to MCRD, San Diego based units conducting Combat 
Readiness training (CRT) at Edson Range. 
D. THE PEOPLE 
Having described the structure, mission and tasks of MCRD, 
Sand Diego, the next section describes the design variable 
and 
1,725
                                                
called people.  This is important in understanding how MCRDSD 
accomplishes its primary mission of making Marines.  The 
individual Marines, sailors and civilian employees of MCRD, San 
Diego comprise a workforce that is as diversified as any 
organization in the Marine Corps in regards to Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS), race, ethnicity and socio-economic 
background.  However, what makes this group of individuals 
unique is the pride they share in ensuring the Marine Corps 
Recruit Depot, San Diego produces the best Marine possible. 
MCRD, San Diego currently employs about 768 civilians 
 active duty personnel37.  Civilians work in almost every 
capacity throughout the depot other than the line community 
directly responsible for the training of recruits.  In regards 
to recruit training, civilians occupy positions in the support 
 
37  Interview with Lt. Col. Henry, G-1, MCRDSD  
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activities such as clothing issue, chow halls, and barbershops 
for example.  Other than those in direct support of the recruit 
training mission, civilians occupy a myriad of staff positions 
from depot headquarters personnel, G-1, Business Improvement 
Officer, etc., to service oriented positions in the post 
exchange, commissary and maintenance and facilities.  
Active duty personnel include Marine and Navy officer and 
enlisted personnel.  Marine officers, as expected aboard a 
                                                
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, work across the spectrum of jobs 
necessary in order for the depot to function.  Junior officers, 
2nd and 1st Lieutenants (0-1 & 0-2 respectively), tend to come to 
the depot in their second tour in fulfillment of a B-billet38 
requirement.  The vast majority of these will serve in billets 
within RTR at the Assistant Series Commander, Series Commander 
level and go on to be Recruit Training Company Commanders or 
hold various staff billets throughout the depot and WFTBN prior 
to PCS rotation as a Captain (0-3).  Majors (0-4) hold various 
staff billets throughout the depot.  Most commonly as Recruit 
Training Battalion Executive Officers or Regimental and Depot 
staff.  The commander of Drill Instructor School is a Major.  
Lieutenant Colonels (0-5) serve as the RTBN Commanding Officers.  
They also serve in key Regimental and Depot staff billets such 
as RTR Executive Officer and Staff Secretary to the CG.  
Colonels (0-6) serve as the RTR, Support Battalion and WFTBN 
CO’s.  Colonels also hold key staff billets at the depot level 
to include the Chief of Staff, G-3, and G-4 for example. The 
senior Marine officer aboard the depot, the Commanding General 
of MCRD, San Diego, is a Major General.   The vast majority of 
Navy officer and enlisted personnel aboard the depot are 
 
38  A B-billet is typically a non-deployable fleet support billet.  
Examples of such are headquarters tours, Recruiting and Recruit Training 
billets. 
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primarily in the medical and dental fields in support of the 
recruit training mission.  





ghout the depot in every command at every level. Junior 
enlisted Marines, Privates (E-1), Privates First Class (E-2), 
Lance Corporals (E-3) and Corporals (E-4) are located in every 
command in one aspect or another.  They are primarily in WFTBN, 
H & S and Support Battalions in general support of the recruit 
training mission.  Sergeants (E-5) though located through out 
the command are commonly in direct support of the recruit 
training mission either as a primary instructor at WFTBN or as 
DI within RTR.  Staff Sergeants (E-6) and Gunnery Sergeants (E-
7), like Sergeants, are commonly in direct support of recruit 
training as either primary instructors at WFTBN or as more 
senior DI’s within RTR.  Gunnery Sergeants also hold the 
critical billet of Series Gunnery Sergeant, though this billet 
can and is sometimes held by a seasoned Staff Sergeant DI.  
First Sergeants (E-8) are, as the rank would lead you to think, 
the senior enlisted Marine at the company level, the Company 
First Sergeant.  Sergeant Majors (E-9) are the senior enlisted 
Marines at every organizational level above and to include 
battalion.  Sergeant Major is the senior enlisted rank. 
Drill Instructors bare additional description, as t
ocus of training effort aboard the depot.  Everything depot 
personnel do in one manner or another is designed to support the 
DI’s ability to train recruits and transform them from a 
civilian to a Marine.  Marines that accept orders to DI School 
do so knowing they are about to embark upon one of the two most 
difficult tours available in the Marine Corps.  This is truly a 
special duty that likens itself more to a calling than a job, 
and thus requires a truly special Marine to be successful.  
 35
Marines that successfully complete DI school and are successful 
DI’s are arguably the most disciplined and dedicated Marines in 
the Marine Corps.  To be a successful DI, you cannot merely show 
up to work and “punch the clock” as it were, DI’s must submerge 
themselves in their work in order to imbue those in their charge 
with the character and traits unique to United States Marines.  
DI’s are the embodiment of sacrifice where 80-110 hour weeks are 
the norm, often to the detriment of their personal lives.  These 
hours are often necessary to ensure that best quality product 
crosses the parade deck on graduation morning.  DI’s embody the 
most professional and rigorous standards of any occupational 
culture within the Marine Corps.   They are truly unique in 
character and their efforts serve to secure and promote the 
Marine Corps success for future generations.  Marine Corps Drill 
Instructors are indeed a crucial design variable integral to 
successful recruit training. 
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IV. THE RECRUIT TRAINING PROCESS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Recruit training is one of the two primary missions of 
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego as set forth in its 
mission statements.  This chapter describes the recruit training 
process.  The structure and processes of recruit training 
interact in many ways, setting the stage for the heart of this 
study.  The reason for a closer is look is that when examining 
the organizations structure it is reasonable to garner a better 
understanding of the primary purpose it was designed to serve.  
The material presented in this chapter is largely drawn from 
various command briefs gathered as part of my document review.   
It is through the recruit training process that civilians 
are transformed into Marines.  This process forges Marines 
through shared hardship and tough training.  This shared, 
intense experience creates bonds of comradeship and standards of 
conduct that form the foundation of success for the U.S M.C.  
Marine recruits are trained physically, mentally, and morally, 
by repeated concentration of Marine Corps core values of honor, 
courage and commitment.  By incorporating these values into the 
transformation process, the Marine Corps is attempting to create 
better Marines and American citizens, who eventually return to 




Honor guides Marines to exemplify the ultimate in 
ethical and moral behavior: to never lie, cheat or 
steal, to abide by an uncompromising code of 
integrity, respect human dignity and respect 
others.  The quality of maturity, dedication, trust 
and dependability commit Marines to act 
responsibly; to be accountable for their actions; 
to fulfill their obligations; and to hold others 
accountable for their actions. 
Courage  
Courage is the mental, moral and physical strength 
ingrained in Marines.  It carries them through the 
hardships of combat and helps them overcome fear.  
It is the inner strength that enables a marine to 
do what is right, to adhere to a higher standard of 
personal conduct and to make tough decisions under 
stress and pressure. 
 
Commitment   
Commitment is the spirit of determination and 
dedication found in Marines.  It leads to the 
highest order of discipline for individuals and 
units.  It is the ingredient that enables 24-hour a 
day dedication to Corps and country.  It inspires 
the unrelenting determination to achieve a standard 
of excellence in every endeavor.39 
There are seven objectives to the recruit training process 
that need to be accomplished in the 63 training days over twelve 
weeks, to yield a basically trained Marine. These seven 
objectives, tangible and intangible, are accomplished via a 
litany of academic and field training requirements conducted in 
accordance with the Program of Instruction (POI).  The seven 
objectives of recruit training are:40 
 1.  Discipline 
 2.  Military Bearing 
 3.  Esprit de Corps  
 4.  Individual General 
     Military Subjects 
 5.  Individual Combat 
     Basic Tasks 
 6.  Physical Fitness 
 7.  Character Development 
In concert with the objectives to be met are six graduation 
requirements each recruit must satisfactorily complete to become 
                                                 
39Marine Corps Core Values downloaded from 
http://www.mcrdsd.usmc.mil/RTR%202/ValuesA.htm 
40  MCRDSD Briefing Document 
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a United States Marine.  Each of the six graduation requirements 
listed below are explained in the overview of the recruit 
training process:41 
 1.  Swim Qualification 
 2.  Practical Examination 
 3.  Physical Fitness Test 
 4.  Rifle Qualification 
 5.  Battalion Commanders Inspection 
 6.  The Crucible 
B. RECRUIT TRAINING CYCLE 
The recruit training cycle consists of the many training 
events recruits must complete in order to become a United States 
Marine.  The following is a breakdown of those events as they 
unfold throughout the training cycle.  It is important to note 
that academic training, core values training, close order drill, 
and physical training occur throughout the training cycle, but 
are listed up front as the majority of this training takes place 
during the first 6 weeks.  A week-by-week overview of the 
training schedule and a daily training calendar are provided in 
Annexes B and C. 
The recruit training cycle is often referred to in phases.  
The first six weeks, conducted aboard MCRDSD, is phase I.  The 
next four weeks, conducted aboard CPEN, is phase II.  And lastly 
the final two weeks of training, conducted back aboard MCRDSD, 
is phase III. 
1. Receiving 
Recruits who arrive aboard the depot begin their process of 
transformation from civilian to Marine as soon as they step off 
the bus and on to the famous yellow footprints where they are 
                                                 
41 MCRDSD Briefing Document 
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met at once by Drill Instructors from Receiving Company.  
Depending upon the day of their arrival, they spend three to 
five days in Receiving before assignment to a training company.  
While in Receiving Company, recruits must perform several 
administrative and physical tasks to ensure they are qualified 
and physically able to begin training. 
A recruit’s first night in receiving is a long one with 
many wearying events taking place.  The “20 second” haircut and 
a urinalysis to test for drug usage are two examples. Recruits 
also receive their initial issue of uniforms and other essential 
items.  Recruits also undergo medical and dental screening to 
ensure they are fit to begin training. 
The first morning brings the “moment of truth”, an amnesty 
period allowing Receiving Company personnel a chance to identify 
any real or potential contract problems that the recruit may 
have failed to disclose to the recruiter prior to enlisting.  
Disqualifying events such as prior drug use or criminal 
convictions are best identified early before the recruit begins 
training. 
The final event the recruits must perform while in 
Receiving is the Initial Strength Test (IST).  The recruit must 
successfully pass this test in order to be assigned to a recruit 
training company.  To pass, recruits must do two, dead-hang 
pull-ups, and forty sit-ups in two minutes, and run a mile and a 
half in 13.5 minutes.  Failure to meet any of these minimum 
requirements will result in the recruit being dropped to 
Physical Conditioning Platoon (PCP) in lieu of a training 
platoon till he is physically capable of passing the IST.  The 
test is conducted and monitored by Receiving Company, however, 
the training company officers and Drill Instructors assist in 
conducting the test. 
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2. Forming 
Following the IST, recruits will join their training 
company where they will be introduced to the Drill Instructors 
responsible for their training and welfare throughout the 
recruit training cycle.  The initial period is referred to as 
forming.  In these three to five days, recruits learn the 
basics: terminology, how to march and wear their uniform, how to 
secure their weapon, chow hall procedures, where things are on 
the Depot and most significantly the Basic Daily Routine, or 
BDR.  The BDR refers to the morning and evening routines in 
addition to conduct within the squad bay.  This period of time 
allows recruits to adjust to their new environment prior to the 
first actual training day. 
3. Academic Training and Close Order Drill 
Throughout the first 35 days of training the recruits 
attend a series of academic courses, e.g. Marine Corps history, 
customs and courtesies, military law, rank structure, and basic 
first aid.  Near the end of this period recruits have to pass 
the first of the graduation requirements, an initial practical 
examination of the material covered.  Those who do not pass 
undergo an intense remedial program on the material until they 
have met the minimum score required.  It is rare that a recruit 
is recycled in training due to an academic failure. 
In addition to attending classes, recruits spend much of 
their training time on the parade deck learning close order 
drill, or COD.  COD is the primary tool for DI’s to instruct and 
instill discipline, esprit de corps and teamwork within their 
platoons.  The importance of COD cannot be understated in the 
molding of a Marine.  It is very common for increased 
proficiency in COD to equate to enhanced platoon performance 
throughout the training cycle. 
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4. Core values 
Core Values training is conducted throughout the training 
cycle and accounts for 54 hours of instruction time.  DI’s, 
Series Officers and the Battalion Chaplain teach specific core 
values courses, but the most significant impact of this training 
occurs between the DI and the recruits either in a one-on-one 
situation or on a platoon level during recruit counseling or 
after a training event.  For example, a DI might talk to the 
platoon about integrity, after the drop of a recruit from 
training for lying, or to a recruit about physical courage after 
someone fails to accomplish a PT event.  Topics covered are not 
restricted to honor, courage and commitment, but cover a 
plethora of related, current issues including integrity, 
discipline, teamwork, duty, drugs and alcohol, suicide 
prevention, and domestic violence.  Core values are integral to 
teaching the meaning of personal responsibility, respect for 
human dignity, and the need to remain true to a higher standard 
of conduct demanded by the Marine Corps. 
5. Physical Training 
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The 77 hours of physical training, or PT, the recruits 
undergo is a progressive training regimen designed to increase 
strength, endurance and flexibility.  PT is a combination of 
platoon formation and individual runs beginning with one and a 
half miles steadily increasing up to three miles, table 
exercises or calisthenics, and foot marches beginning at three 
miles and increasing to five and ten miles.  Physical training 
is also used to foster teamwork and esprit within the squads and 
platoons.  Each recruits level of physical fitness is measured 
by the Physical Fitness test (PFT), whereby recruits perform 
pull-ups, sit-ups and a three mile run.  To pass they must 
complete three pull-ups, 44 sit-ups in two minutes and finish 
the run in less than 28 minutes.  
In conjunction with PT, recruits also must conduct the 
obstacle and confidence courses.  The obstacle course is a 
demanding seven-station event, requiring stamina, strength and 
agility.  The stations are run in sequence as fast as the 
recruit can safely accomplish them, culminating in a rope climb.  
The confidence course is an 11-station event whose purpose is as 
it name implies, to build confidence in the recruit’s ability to 
perform physically demanding tasks.  The goal is not to finish 
in a certain time, but to finish each station and give the 
recruit a sense of accomplishment.   
6. Water Survival Training 
In the fifth week of training recruits move to the pool to 
begin 20 hours of water survival training under the instruction 
of Support Battalion personnel.  Water survival training is 
intended to increase the recruits confidence and ability to 
survive in the water.  Here, the recruits master techniques to 
maneuver in the water and have the skill to survive extended 
periods of time in the water.  Training at the lower levels 
(e.g. CWS-IV)42 only requires the recruit to be in uniform.  
Training at higher levels of difficulty (CWS-I or II) requires 
additional gear to include the M-16, flak jacket, pack and 
helmet.   The level of proficiency a recruit must acquire is 
dependent upon their assigned Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS).  However, all recruits must complete CWS-IV at a minimum. 
7. Team Week 
After five weeks of training, the recruits enter what is 
referred to as “team week”, the final week of phase I.  During 
this period, recruits traditionally work in the mess halls and 
with base maintenance personnel aboard the depot and at Weapons 
                                                 
42 CWS stands for Combat Water Survival. There are four progressive levels 
of proficiency assigned to recruits.  CWS-1 the highest and CWS-4 the lowest. 
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and Field Training Battalion (WFTBN).  This is the first time 
recruits are out from under the direct supervision of their DI’s 
and are expected to conduct themselves accordingly, while 
accomplishing the menial tasks assigned them.  However, due to 
the recent civilian contracting of the mess hall personnel, 
recruits are no longer required to fill these and other tasks.  
This has opened up a week of training hours now available to 
recruit training personnel.  The latest recruit training 
schedule modification43 indicates the inclusion of instruction 
in small unit leadership, driver improvement and interior guard. 
8. Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
The latest innovation to the recruit training process is 
the implementation of the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
(MCMAP)44 in October of 2000.  MCMAP replaces the Linear 
Integrated Neuro-overide Engagement (L.I.N.E.) training.  It 
instructs recruits and Marines in a more logical, easier to 
learn method of offensive and defensive close combat skills.  
MCMAP is combined with pugil-stick training that focuses on 
bayonet fighting and provides the recruits an opportunity to 
practice the techniques they have learned. 
9. Marksmanship Training 
At the end of the sixth week, recruit training moves north 
to WFTBN at Edson Range, Camp Pendleton for Phase I and II 
marksmanship training.  This encompasses 126 hours of 
instruction over the course of weeks seven through nine.  The 
first week, Phase-I, Preparatory Marksmanship Training, is more 
commonly referred to as “grass week” or “snap-in week”.  This 
first week covers 50 hours of marksmanship instruction, by Range 
Company personnel, including firing techniques and fundamentals, 
                                                 
43 MCRDSD Training modification 35-03 
44 ALMAR 042/01 
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sight adjustments, weather considerations, and the four 
different firing positions: standing, kneeling, sitting and 
prone.  At the conclusion of “grass week”, recruits’ have their 
first live-fire event, a grouping exercise, conducted in order 
to zero their weapon for the following weeks qualification 
firing.  The second week, Phase-II, Known Distance Firing, is 
live-fire whereby the recruits fire variations of the Known 
Distance (KD) course for the first three days, shooting the 
actual KD qualification course of fire on the fourth day.  The 
fifth day is the actual day of qualification firing for 
recruits, firing 50 rounds from distances of 200, 300 and 500 
yards using only iron sights. 
10. Field Firing Range (FFR) 
Once recruits have successfully qualified with the M-16A2 
service rifle they progress to phase-III of the marksmanship 
program conducted over the course of week 9, the third week at 
Edson Range.  During FFR they will receive 40 hours of field 
firing instruction on how to fire their weapons in varying 
combat conditions.  Recruits conduct live-fire exercises in gas 
masks, full combat equipment and engage multiple and moving 
targets at unknown distances in low light/night conditions. 
11. Basic Warrior Training (BWT) 
BWT is a three-day field training package, with over 20 
hours of instruction, focusing on teaching recruits to operate 
in a field environment using their combat issue.  Instruction 
covers the set-up of shelter-halves, subsisting on Meals-Ready-
to-Eat (MRE’s), learning to operate within a Nuclear, Biological 
and Chemical (NBC) environment to include going through the gas 
chamber, and other necessary field skills such as field 
sanitation and camouflage.  The skills they learn here will be 
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instrumental in the conduct of the Crucible and follow-on 
training at either SOI or MCT. 
12. The Crucible 
The final evolution at Edson Range is the conduct of the 
Crucible, referred to as the “defining moment”.  The Crucible is 
the recruits’ greatest challenge in recruit training.  The 54-
hour evolution includes 50 plus miles of foot marches, 32 events 
and stations to include; day and night combat assault courses, 
problem-solving stations and team-building events.  Recruits 
also are subjected to sleep and food deprivation, receiving only 
four-hours of sleep a night and two and a-half MRE’s to last 
them over the course of the Crucible.  The purpose of the sleep 
and meal deprivation is to simulate the stress inherent to 
combat conditions.   It is important to note that throughout the 
conduct of the Crucible, the focus is on Core Values and 
teamwork. 
13. Transition Phase 
Upon completion of training at WFTBN, the recruits return 
to MCRDSD to complete the final two weeks of training, Phase 
III.  These two weeks are referred to as the transition phase, 
whereby recruits make the final “transition” from recruit to 
Marine.  These weeks can be very hectic as there is much that 
needs to get done.  The first week encompasses several 
graduation requirements such as the final academic examination, 
the PFT, and the Battalion Commanders Inspection.  Company Final 
Drill and the Motivational Run, both of which are non-graduation 
requirements, are also conducted during this phase. The 
transition phase ends with the Eagle, Globe and Anchor ceremony 
whereby the Drill Instructors present their recruits with Marine 
Corps insignia signifying their new status of Marine. 
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14. Family Day and Graduation 
The final two days of recruit training are family day and 
graduation.  The day prior to graduation, recruits get an 
afternoon of on-base liberty to spend with family and friends 
whom they haven’t seen since arriving aboard the depot.  Lastly, 
the final event in the recruit training process is the 
graduation parade denoting their successful transition from 
civilian to Marine. 
Upon graduation the new Marines will readily depart the 
depot on 10 days of leave enroute to either the School of 
Infantry (SOI) or Marine Combat Training (MCT).  Both of these 
training commands are located aboard CAMPEN.  Which school a 
Marine attends will be based on their MOS designator assigned to 
them in the latter days of recruit training, if it had not 
already been assigned initially through the enlistment 
contracting process.  Infantry Marines will attend SOI and all 
non-infantry Marines attend MCT.  A few of the graduates will 
have the opportunity to go back to their home towns and 
participate in the Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program 
(PRASP), for up to 30 days prior to reporting to SOI or MCT to 
assist in the Marine Corps recruiting efforts.  Upon completion 
of SOI or MCT, the new Marine then attends their MOS school, 
where they will the learn skill they are expected to perform in 



























































V.  ANALYSIS OF MCRD, SAN DIEGO 
A. DATA REVIEW 
Data used in this analysis are derived primarily from of 30 
semi-structured interviews conducted with depot personnel 
ranging from the Commanding General to Drill Instructors.  
Though a specific interview protocol was used, interviews were 
flexible, and participants were encouraged to expand upon their 
answers and provide additional insights if desired.  Telephone 
communications, emails, and three years of personal experience 
in recruit training were also sources of contributing data.    
B. MCRDSD SYSTEMS MODEL 
Systems theory provided the theoretical foundation for this 
study.  The systems model was selected as a tool having 
diagnostic and predictive capabilities useful for analyzing the 
relatively complex process of converting civilians into basic 
trained Marines.  The model also facilitates drawing conclusions 
and making recommendations for improvements.   Figure 10 is the 
“generic” systems model discussed in Chapter II and Figure 11 is 
an adaptation of the model in terms of an MCRDSD overlay 
1. Environment/Context 
There are several factors to consider when describing the 
environment or context of MCRDSD.  As discussed earlier in 
chapter 2, they are the external environment, resources and 
history of the organization.  The external environment can best 
be described in terms of political, social, economic and 
technological arenas that influence the daily decisions and 
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and values in the
system as they are
expressed in behavior?
¾How is conflict managed?






¾Does the culture(s) 
fit the larger environment?
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¾What are the basic tasks?
How formalized?





¾How can the work flow be
described?
¾What are the activities in the
work flow?
¾What are the key inter-
dependencies among the
work units or activities in
the work flow?
¾What is the condition of the
physical facilities and equipment?
STRUCTURE 
¾How to describe the structure?
¾What are the basic groupings of
activities and people?  How are 
activities/tasks combined?
Departmentalized?
¾How are the groupings integrated?








¾Who are the people? Motives, expectations, mindsets?
¾What are their knowledge, skills and abilities?
PROCESS/SUBSYSTEMS
¾Financial Management, Measurement &Controls?
- How are people held accountable for resources?
Describe:  budgeting, control, performance
measurement, performance appraisal processes.
- Do these mechanisms of accountability produce the
desired patterns of behavior?
¾Human Resource Management
- How do we recruit, select, retain, rotate, promote,
Terminate, retire our people?  Do we have the kind of
People we need?
- How do we train and develop people and are our
current efforts adequate?  Describe: OJT, formal
training programs, team building or other 
organizational development activities, career
development.
- What is formally rewarded (both positive and 
negative rewards)?  What is the basic compensation 
package:  bonus & commissions, opportunities for
advancement, recognition & praise?  Are rewards
tied to performance assessment?
¾Communication Information Planning and Decision 
Making
- How do we communicate?
- How do we gather, process, distribute and evaluate
Information?
- How do we plan?
- How do we make decisions?
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Figure 10. Systems Model45 
Politically, MCRDSD exists in a military friendly local and 
regional environment, as there is a strong military presence 
throughout much of southern California.  The Marine Corps  
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45 Dr. Nancy Roberts, Systems Model, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, 1998. 
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SOP/POI;
Requires Highly Trained/ 
Disciplined Marines;
Tasks are Differentiated;
DI’s are Primary Instructors;
Officers are Supervisors;
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TECHNOLOGY
Progressive, Building Block 
Approach;
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Instruction via Leadership by 
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(Minimal Info. Tech. Required);
Key Interdependency’s: Trng Co’s 
& Sppt Bn, RTR & WFTBn.;
Condition of Physical Facilities 
though immaculate in appearance 
are aged & dated
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PEOPLE
Ranks of E-1 through 0-8 (Depots Focus is Support of DI’s 
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Highly Adaptable;
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“No Allegations” is a reward for Trainers;
Platoon/Company Achievements regarding scores/percentages 
receive little recognition beyond Company/Battalion;
Untypical Low Scores/Percentages will capture attention of 
RTR/ maybe Depot;
One “Ah Shi@” can wipe away all “Atta Boys”
Controls
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) & Program of 
Instruction (POI);






Meeting Fleet Marine Force requirements;
Quality Control of Drill Instructors;
Graduating Percentages;
Number of Allegations (Substantiated/ Unsubstantiated);
Training/ Scheduling & Training Coordination “Snafu’s” 
Communication/Planning
Communication done Face to Face, E-mail, Phone-con, 
Meetings & Briefs;  See increasing reliance upon tech;
Planning is “rote” for most part.  Done in reaction to Changes;





has bases in close proximity with Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Pendleto30 miles to the north and Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 
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46 Adapted from Dr. Nancy Roberts, The Systems Model, unpublished, 1998. 
Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, and Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS), Miramar to the west.  Together, the city of San Diego 
and the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, are the 
recipients of this historically positive relationship.  The 
city, the seventh largest in the U. S.47, provides the depot 
with a significant and convenient transportation hub through 
which nearly a hundred thousand visitors48 to the depot pass 
each year, and which the Marine Corps in turn can use to satisfy 
its logistical and transportation requirements.   
One detractor from the seemingly politically friendly 
environment is the ongoing political debate over the expansion 
of the city’s airport, Lindberg Field.  Currently, San Diego’s 
airport is unable to meet the needs of the populous nor the 
demand for air travel to its city in that it has only one runway 
capable of serving large commercial aircraft. Further, the 
airports current location is geographically restrictive and does 
not allow for expansion in any direction other than towards the 
Depot.  The Depots proximity to the airport leaves many 
questioning if the Marine Corps property could be put to better 
use, i.e., consolidation of recruit training aboard Camp 
Pendleton and expansion of Lindberg Field with MCRD land is an 
example of changing the land usage.  The leadership of the Depot 
has responded diligently to work with the city in resolving this 
issue.  Over the years, the Marine Corps has signed over 
substantial acreage to the city for the purpose of expanding the 
airport and currently has several airport guidance and 
navigational systems located on and throughout its property.49.  
Additionally, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Act of 
                                                 
47 Downloaded from http:// www.infoplease.com/cgi-bin/id/A0108476.html. 
48 MCRDSD Briefing Document. 
49 MCRDSD Briefing Document. 
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199050, is a considerable political issue across all of the 
services, most notably since the next round of base closures is 
due in 2005.  Though MCRDSD does not consider itself a candidate 
for this round of base closures, Depot leadership remains 
proactive in espousing the historical significance, validity and 
legitimacy of the Depot.  Despite being located in an urban 
environment not conducive to its mission, forcing the geographic 
separation in its training schedule, MCRDSD leaders state that 
the depot remains “a premier installation in the Marine Corps”51 
and is a “jewel in the Marine Corps crown”52.   To this end, the 
Depot includes within its boundaries a 110-acre historical 
district and 25 buildings that were nominated to the National 
Register of Historic Places in 199153.  Its place in history has 
become cemented in the San Diego community and in turn the city 
has become part and parcel to the history and traditions of the 
Marine Corps Recruit Depot. 
Beyond the political relationship and geographical 
proximity to each other, the Depot has quite a significant 
economic impact upon the city and its local areas.  It is 
estimated that the Depot contributes over $190 million dollars54 
to the local economy via tourism, and operating and payroll 
costs of the Depot itself.  A substantial portion of this 
amount, estimated at 20 million dollars, is considered 
“recession proof dollars”.55  The generally accepted belief is 
that regardless of the health of the economy, families will 
still travel to and visit the Depot to attend the graduation of 
                                                 
50 Downloaded from  http://aec.army.mil/usaec/restoration/brac00.html 
51 Anonymous interview 
52 Anonymous interview 
53 MCRDSD Briefing Document. 
54 MCRDSD Briefing Document. 
55 Anonymous interview. 
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their loved one.  Per one senior Marine leader, “Money talks – 
and that’s where we talk the loudest – financially”. 
The regional and national health of the economy impacts the 
depot in turn.  Historically, the health of the domestic 
economy, as measured by the unemployment rate, is inversely 
related to the number of active-duty enlistment contracts 
attained.  Theoretically, the current economic downturn 
positively impacts the Depots external environment in regard to 
recruiting efforts and success, i.e., the Depots ability to 
provide for the key input, recruits, to the recruit training 
process.  This notion as put forth by a military-economic study 
by Asch & Warner (1995), is the healthier the economy or lower 
the unemployment rate, the more challenging it is to recruit and 
enlist qualified individuals.  And as is currently the 
situation, the higher the unemployment rate, the less 
challenging it is to recruit qualified individuals.56 
Recruiting and recruit training commands are unlike most 
other commands in the Marine Corps in that they are well 
resourced in both personnel and money.  The Marine Corps has 
long recognized the criticality of successful recruiting and 
recruit training efforts and how this translates to sustained 
combat readiness.  Thus, they place a high priority on both 
missions as evidenced by Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5320.12D57.  
This calls for the Depot to be staffed at 95 percent of the 
chargeable T/O (Table of Organization)58, or a manning level of 
100 percent.  As per the Commanding General of MCRD, San Diego, 
“I have never been to a command such as this one.  In past 
                                                 
56 Warner, John T., and  Asch, Beth J, Handbook of Defense Economics, 
Volume I, RAND, 1995. 
57 MCO 5320.12D. 
58 The Table of Organization (T/O) for a command is a list, by grade and 
MOS, of the manpower required to complete that units mission.  
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commands, I have always had to fight or ask for more money to 
accomplish my mission.  But, here they have given me all the 
money and people I need to get the mission done.  It’s unlike 
any other command I have ever worked in before.”59    
There are social environmental factors that shape the 
external environment of MCRDSD.  In a post 9/11-environment, the 
war on terrorism has reawakened a call from legislatures for 
national service in one form or another ranging from mandatory 
civil service to active duty military, i.e., a draft.  While 
interest in the military, or some other form of national service 
has doubled since 9/11, this has not translated into any marked 
increase in enlistments60.  Though policy makers at the Pentagon 
refute the necessity of a draft, the impacts of such legislation 
if it were to be implemented upon recruit training, length of 
service contracts, benefits, etc., would be significant.  Other 
social environmental factors impact MCRDSD.  An increased 
propensity or aspirations of the nations youth to attend college 
coupled with the decreased desire to serve the country make the 
recruiting effort even more challenging61. 
MCRDSD pursues an aggressive community outreach program 
with Marines participating in various local volunteer and mentor 
programs, color guards, and community events.  The Depot also 
chose to support the Suzuki Rock n’ Roll marathon, one of the 
nations largest marathons, by allowing the race to finish on the 
Depot parade deck,62 when cost concerns threatened the 
survivability of the race.  The Depot strives to be as integral 
a part of the community that it can, knowing the benefit this 
                                                 
59 CG Interview 
60 Solis, Dianne, US Looking For Some More Good Men & Women, Military 
Enlistment Stagnant, Dallas Morning News Oct 13, 2002. 
61 Ibid. 
62 MCRDSD Briefing Document. 
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brings to both the Marine Corps and the people of San Diego.  
Per the current chief of staff, Mr. Meyers, “We feel that it is 
essential that we are an active member in the community.  That 
we are a partner with them and we will do everything in our 
power consistent with our mission accomplishment to try and help 
the community in every way we can”63.  
2. Key Success Factors 
The key success factors for MCRDSD identified through 
interviews with MCRDSD leadership are its people, training, and 
basic Marine Corps leadership.   These three components combine 
in every aspect of depot functions to facilitate mission 
success.  They were uniformly the responses given during the 
interview portion of the data collection process. 
The quality of people of MCRD, San Diego is an important 
key success factor as described during the interview process.  
General Huly states, “Key is the selection and training of those 
who make the process work.  It starts with who we select and 
train as our recruiters and Recruiting Station (RS) commanding 
officers.  Because you’re not going to make a silk purse out of 
a sow’s ear.  It’s also who we select to be the Drill 
Instructors, Series Commanders, Company Commanders, Rifle range 
Coaches, Commanding Officers in this process to sustain that 
process.  That’s what makes a good product.  That’s the key.”64  
These quality Marines, more specifically the Drill Instructors, 
are sought from the operating forces and elsewhere.  Their 
commands are required to complete a command screening checklist 
that in essence says, this Marine is personally and 
professionally qualified for a tour on the drill field.  
                                                 
63 Interview with Mr. Myers, G-1, MCRDSD, November 2002. 
64 Interview with Major General Huly, Commanding General, MCRDSD, 
November, 2002. 
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Additionally, it is helpful that Marine Corps commands, for the 
most part, are sensitive to the recruit training mission and the 
quality of individual it takes to be an effective Drill 
Instructor.  This subjective assessment assists in further 
screening of potential DI candidates and maintains the current 
quality spread.  Though, in the mind of one senior enlisted 
personnel, outside commands could afford to be more discerning.  
He believes the attrition at DI school to be too high, 
graduating on average “50 out of every 70 or so”.  He says, 
“There are too many failing out that shouldn’t have been here to 
start with.”65 
In concert with people is trust.  Trust between the DI’s 
and the battalion and RTR officers and senior enlisted is 
paramount to mission success.  It creates an environment of 
mutual respect and admiration that facilitates the DI’s ability 
to be successful in their task.  As one senior enlisted put it, 
“We have to trust our DI’s and the DI’s have to trust their 
chain of command.  If they do make a mistake, they need to know 
and understand that – trust us to make the right decision.”66 
The training at MCRDSD is the second key success factor for 
the Depot.  This training applies to that which the permanent 
personnel must undergo in order to take part in the recruit 
training process.  For enlisted recruit trainers, that training 
is Drill Instructor school.  The school is seen as the “crux of 
success” and the “quality control device” by the regimental 
commander.  He further says, “if I can get good people out of my 
DI school, I’ll get good recruits out of my regiment and 
everyone will be better off in the fleet.”67   This is echoed in 
                                                 
65 Anonymous interview 
66 Anonymous interview 
67 Interview with Colonel Thaler, Commanding Officer, RTR, November, 2002. 
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the schools motto of “The future of the Marine Corps begins 
here.”  Drill Instructor school is first and foremost a 
leadership school focusing on developing the leadership 
abilities and potential of future DI’s.  It is 11 intense weeks 
of training to prepare the Marine for what will most certainly 
be his or her most difficult tour.  This level of intensity is 
necessary and required in order to adequately prepare these 
future DI’s for what lies ahead.  Officers that are assigned to 
RTR, or will otherwise take part in the recruit training 
process, attend the Series Officer Course (SOC).  SOC, also 
conducted at the DI school under the tutelage of the assistant 
director of DI school, a post company command captain, is a 10 
day orientation package designed to familiarize the new series 
officer with his new environment and responsibilities.  The 
course covers basic drill, physical fitness, General Military 
Subjects and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) evaluations 
along with panel discussions with personnel throughout the depot 
who contribute to the recruit training process either directly 
or indirectly.   This course also provides the DI school staff 
an opportunity to evaluate the incoming officers and if need be, 
forward a recommendation to RTR that a particular individual 
need not be assigned to a recruit training company for cause, 
i.e. lack of maturity, professionalism, physical fitness, 
appearance, etc.  The bulk of the training a new series officer 
will receive is done on the job while “shadowing”68 a current 
series commander.  Here, a certain level of knowledge and 
proficiency must be demonstrated to the company commander and 
company staff before being qualified to assume the billet of a 
recruit training series commander.  Whether officer or enlisted, 
                                                 
68 Shadowing is when a new officer, not yet qualified to oversee recruit 
training on his own, observes training with a current recruit training 
officer till he is qualified. 
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the quality of instruction they receive at DI school is 
instrumental not only to their success, but to that of the 
Marine Corps as a whole.  Both the Commanding General and the 
RTR Commander recognize the importance of DI school to their 
mission and have resourced the school in personnel and resources 
accordingly. 
The third key success factor identified was leadership.  
The ability to “arouse or inspire men to rise to great 
achievements by perceiving their capacities and motivations, 
articulating the goals to be achieved, and inspiring the efforts 
and sacrifices needed to achieve them. In this sense, leadership 
seems somehow mystical – and unattainable for the ordinary 
person.”69  This in essence captures the role of the DI in the 
recruit training process, the ability to make the recruits 
believe in themselves and instill in them a degree of 
confidence, arrogance and aggressiveness.  This is inculcation, 
or indoctrination of the Marine Corps culture is something that 
is not replicated in any of the other services.   It is truly a 
unique style of leadership, almost “mystical”, that is imparted 
upon the recruits by the DI.   As the RTR CO says, “the beauty 
of this place is just basic Marine Corps leadership.  MOS 
regardless.”70  More specifically, it’s “leadership from the 
front.”   All Marines, enlisted and officer alike, understand 
the degree of selflessness and sacrifice that is incumbent upon 
them as leaders.  And perhaps more than most other commands, in 
times of peace, is this more evident or held to a higher 
standard than on a Marine Corps recruit training depot. 
 
                                                 
69 Bower, Marvin, The Will to Manage, McGraw-Hill San Francisco, 1966   
70  Interview with Colonel Thaler, Commanding Officer, RTR. 
55 Anonymous Interview 
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3. System Direction 
Marines aboard the Depot often receive their formal 
guidance from their leaders face-to-face, whether it is on a one 
to one basis, or en masse via a unit commander speaking with the 
personnel of his unit in a classroom or auditorium on a periodic 
basis.  The idea is that the leaders understand that those 
subordinate to them must hear their guidance from them 
personally in order for their message to have meaning and 
purpose.  It also lends itself towards establishing credibility 
as a leader.  Depot leaders formal guidance is further published 
in letter format, referred to as Commanders Guidance, and 
disseminated to the lowest common denominator where it is 
displayed in common areas, series offices and company offices, 
battalion offices, etc., to serve as a reminder of the 
commanders intent.  This guidance is seen as critical.  As one 
senior enlisted personnel puts it, “the guidance we get from the 
commander is critical.  I don’t think we could do our job 
effectively without understanding and knowing his guidance.  It 
really starts from there.”71 
The mission, or goal of the Depot is well defined, clear 
and concise.  And that is to make basically trained Marines.  
Nothing more.  Nothing less.  Everyone aboard the Depot 
recognizes this as it was unanimously relayed through the data 
collection process. As one enlisted Marine said, “We’re here to 
make a basically trained Marine, not to our standard, but to the 
Marine Corps standard. We’re not looking for super squad 
members.  Were not looking for Marines who could attack a hill 
tomorrow.  Just a basic trained Marine.”72 
                                                 
 
72 Anonymous Interview. 
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The direction or guidance espoused by the Commanding 
General is described as an “operational mindset”73.  He espouses 
that it is important for everyone at every level, regardless of 
their relationship to the recruit training mission to be 
proactive and ask questions, “What are we doing that we could be 
doing better? What are we doing that we shouldn’t be doing?  
What are we not doing that we should be doing?” As one key staff 
officer says, “The fact that we can question what we are doing 
is beautiful.”74  He has begun a planning culture within Depot 
staff offices.  Such thinking in the has led to past innovations 
in recruit training like the Crucible and instilling Core Values 
training into the curriculum.  An example of the direction, 
values or guidance espoused by the Commanding General in concert 
with an “operational mindset” is the understanding that the end 
state to mission accomplishment is increased combat readiness in 
the operation forces.  This is best exemplified by the following 
quote, “I want a hard hitting physical outfit - I’m not training 
the Viennese Boy’s Choir here.”75  While he provides for the 
welfare of recruits, a priority above all else, he further shows 
understanding for the arduous and tenuous environment within 
which the DI’s work, via slight informal SOP changes.  “I don’t 
want my DI’s walking around on pins and needles…..they’re 
human!”76 
In contrast to the obvious physical purpose of the Depot 
itself, the guidance passed down and the espoused values of its 
leadership, it was evident in the interview process that some 
officer and enlisted personnel feel that recruit training is not 
                                                 
73 Anonymous Interview. 
74 Anonymous Interview 




the priority of the Depot. The following was recorded.  “I don’t 
get the feeling there is a set of priorities on the Depot that 
says this is the most important thing we do”, says one senior 
Marine.  Another senior Marine felt that “we need to refocus the 
depot back on recruit training as opposed to community 
relations, PAO,…..”  Or as another senior enlisted Marine said 
when commenting on coordination between units and commands, 
“with supporting within RTR, adequate.  Outside RTR – let’s just 
say our priorities are not necessarily their priorities.”  And 
“We revolve around them instead of them revolving around us”.  
In addition, there was ample concern for the level of attention 
paid to the successful conduct of, and the prevalence of 
civilian tours, educator tours and media interference aboard the 
depot and the adverse impact these evolutions in turn had on 
recruit trainers and recruit training.  It was expressed that 
these evolutions, though conceded to be important, leave the 
recruit trainers to believe their work in fact is not the 
priority.   
4.  Design Factors 
a. Technology and Tasks 
What is the nature of the work aboard MCRD, San Diego?  
What specification is required?  Per this study, the following 
four processes are considered basic technologies critical to the 
MCRDSD organization. 
• MCRDSD is responsible for all recruiting 
efforts, programs and enlisted accessions within 
the Western Recruiting Region in accordance with 
the Commandants guidance, and in accordance with 
the needs of the Operating Forces. 
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• MCRDSD is responsible for the receiving, 
processing and training of all recruits into 
basically trained Marines in accordance with the 
Commandants guidance, and in accordance with the 
needs of the Operating Forces. 
• MCRDSD is responsible for the development and 
conduct of training those Marines assigned to 
and responsible for the accomplishment of both 
the recruiting and recruit training efforts. 
• MCRDSD pursues an aggressive, community outreach 
program to maintain a positive community 
presence and relationship with the greater San 
Diego area. 
          The scope of this research, however, is limited 
only to that organizational structure which pertains to the 
recruit training process.  And in as much, the tasks related to 
making Marines for the most part are very routine, purposefully 
standardized, formalized and highly structured.  The tasks are 
built around the execution of the POI in accordance with the 
SOP.  The Program of Instruction, the 12-week training regimen 
described in an earlier chapter, is a cyclic and repetitive 
process.  It can further be described as predictable and 
somewhat automated.  The process follows a progressive, building 
block approach in as much as it resembles an assembly line, mass 
production effort towards making basic trained Marines. 
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The execution of tasks in support of the recruit 
training process is in turn similar, i.e. standardized.  
However, the tasks vary dependent upon billet and 
responsibilities.  The primary trainer in the recruit training 
process is obviously the DI.  Though his tasks will vary from 
training day to training day, his responsibilities on any given 
training day are the same for that particular training day for 
any future training cycle.  The POI is a rigid, and often 
inflexible, training regimen, and recruit training calendars are 
often set as far as a year in advance.  Thus, recruit trainers 
can accurately predict where they will be and what training they 
will be conducting on any given training day months in advance.  
This is similarly true for commanders and staff above the 
company level, the only difference being the scope with which 
they observe, supervise and support the recruit training 
process, i.e., company, battalion, regiment, etc.  A recruit 
training battalion has oversight of four recruit training 
companies, RTR has oversight of three battalions, or up to 
twelve companies.  However, above the battalion level, tasks and 
responsibilities can become blurred.  While all subordinate 
recruit training units are on the same training schedule, no two 
units are on the same training day.  The execution of the POI 
rotates among the lettered company’s in alphabetical order. 
There exists at the core of recruit training 
efforts, most especially at the enlisted instructor level, a 
degree of specification and differentiation, or a variance in 
tasks and units assigned to conduct them.  DI’s are the primary 
instructors of recruits and conduct the vast majority of the 
training in addition to mentorship, guidance and leadership.  
However, there are supporting instructors that conduct 
specialized, specific training critical to the making of a 
Marine.  A prime example of this is the Marines of Instructional 
Training Company, Support Battalion, who provide academic 
instruction, swim instruction and qualification, and close 
combat instruction to recruits.  Additionally, the Marines of 
Range Company and Field Company, WFTBN, who conduct formalized 
marksmanship training, expert field training and supervise the 
conduct of the Crucible.  In each case, there is specialized 
training conducted by specific personnel from an outside 
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supporting agency that the recruit training companies are 
dependent upon. 
Supporting agencies, such as Support Battalion 
and WFTBN provide key interdependencies to recruit training 
battalions in support of the recruit training mission.  Per the 
POI and the established organizational structure, there is a 
sequential interdependence amongst all units involved in the 
recruit training process as training platoons, series and 
company’s rotate to and from training conducted by these 
critical supporting units.   
b. Structure 
          MCRDSD is structured as a traditional, military, top-
down hierarchy.  Branches are grouped by tasks with various 
supporting and tenant commands falling under the Chief of Staff.  
The organizational structure is similar to what you might find 
in any command throughout the Marine Corps.  There is the Depot 
headquarters atop the organization, and from there in descending 
order, are the RTR, RTBNs, RTCos, lead and follow (trace) 
series, and recruit training platoons. The overall structure of 
the Depot is in line with its mission of making Marines with one 
possible exception, WFTBN.  The only noticeable differentiation 
from a traditional command slate is WFTBN is on par with RTR 
organizationally and is commanded by a Colonel (0-6), as is the 
RTR.  The reason this is noteworthy is the mission of WFTBN, 
critical as it is, is subordinate to, and in support of RTR’s 
overarching mission to make basic trained Marines.  Placing this 
important command apart and on par with RTR may be cause for 
concern.   This has not gone unnoticed by the Depot leadership 
and they recognize the structural overlap.  The justification 
for the WFTBN being commanded by an 0-6 (vice an 0-5), is it’s 
location aboard CPEN, 30 miles to the north at Edson Range.  The 
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WFTBN commander is assigned the collateral duty assignment of an 
Area Commander of Camp Pendelton77.  Since all area commanders 
aboard CPEN are Colonels (0-6), were the CO of WFTBN a 
Lieutenant Colonel (0-5), it is argued that he and his command 
would be at a distinct disadvantage in the ongoing scramble for 
scarce resources from the Base CG, CPEN.  This reasoning will be 
discussed further in the following chapter. 
Lateral and vertical coordination between units 
is conducted both formally and informally.  However, due to the 
nature of recruit training and the intended inflexibility of the 
POI, coordination is most normally done through formal channels.  
This is critical in ensuring compliance with the POI and SOP, 
which in turn acts as a safeguard on behalf of the recruits, and 
recruit trainers’ personal and professional welfare.  The formal 
coordination between appropriate and authorized personnel aboard 
MCRDSD also allows for accountability among the coordinating 
units and facilitates the flow of communication between the 
commanders and staff who are directly accountable for their 
units actions.  Lateral and vertical informal coordination also 
occurs quite frequently and is often instrumental in the 
execution of the recruit training day.  Informal coordination, 
vastly lateral in nature, is most commonly exercised by 
battalion level SNCOs with peers in adjacent, subordinate, 
higher and supporting units.  Often referred to as “gunny 
grease”, this type of coordination, when successful, allows 
smaller units to be flexible, when practical, even if it 
accounts for a deviation from the POI.   However, the 
inflexibility and rigidity of the organization can and often 
does frustrate these efforts. 
                                                 
77 MCB, Camp Pendleton is zoned into several “areas”, each with a 
designated commander responsible for the maintenance of that training area. 
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The physical layout of the Depot is not optimized 
towards mission accomplishment.  In addition to the geographic 
separation from WFTBN as discussed earlier, the ground s of the 
Depot are restrictive and allow for rudimentary training outside 
of C.O.D. and classroom instruction only.  However, the 
buildings housing the various commands and schoolhouses are 
centralized, encircling a massive parade deck in the middle of 
the Depot.  The various commands occupy building space in a 
logical, orderly manner that facilitates communication between 
the commands and the conduct of training. 
All the commands aboard the depot are 
interdependent upon one another in order to accomplish the 
recruit training mission.  This interdependency is resultant of 
the supported-supporting unit relationship commonly found in 
military organizations.  Aboard the depot, RTBNs are the 
supported unit, and commands such as SPPTBN, WFTBN, H&SBN, etc. 
are the supporting units.  There are no autonomous commands 
associated with the recruit training process. 
Liaison personnel are used throughout the command 
to facilitate coordination among units.  These personnel, 
commonly DI’s from RTR, are placed in key areas such as Dental 
and Receiving to assist in the accountability of recruits and 
ensure training and logistical concerns are handled 
expeditiously and at the lowest level.  Currently there is no 
liaison on staff at WFTBN. 
Recruit training is a 24-hour a day, seven day a 
week responsibility.  Training is conducted from 0800 to 1700 
daily Monday through Friday and from 0800 to 1300 on Saturdays.  
Sundays are reserved for religious services and a few short 
hours of free time to prepare for the upcoming week’s training.  
Recruits are required to be supervised at all times.  This 
 67
requires DI’s and Company officers to be in the company of the 
recruits for long hours, with DIs consistently working in the 
80-100 hour a week range.    
c. People 
MCRDSD appears to have the right mix of people 
for the work required.  This organization is a veritable 
“melting pot” as it brings together a wide variety of 
individuals from throughout the Marine Corps with various ranks, 
skills, backgrounds and experiences.  And due to the preliminary 
screening process for DI duty, the command screening checklist, 
those selected for this arduous duty arrive with the character, 
discipline and motivations necessary to be successful recruit 
trainers, MOS regardless. 
Enlisted recruit trainers come from a wide 
variety of backgrounds and having varying degrees of years in 
service and experience on the drill field.  MCRDSD achieves a 
proper mix of the youth and energy of first time DIs with senior 
enlisted personnel, almost all of whom are on the second or 
third tour in recruit training.  This allows for a proper 
balance between the aggressiveness of the junior DIs and the 
maturity and experience of the senior DIs and staff.  
Furthermore, first time DIs, commonly sergeants between 5-8 
years of service, are beginning to see the Marine Corps as a 
career.  This “careerist”78 outlook lends itself towards the 
professionalism and maturity required to have a successful tour 
and as such will be viewed on par with recruiters in regards to 
promotability later on in the Marines career. 
                                                 
78 Careerists are defined as Marines beyond 8 years of active-duty status.  
This is a noteworthy milestone in that the vast majority of enlisted that 
remain in service beyond this point go to the twenty-year mark. 
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Officers are given orders to the Depot based upon 
availability, career track and eligibility for career level 
schools, regardless of MOS.  They range in rank from 2nd 
Lieutenant to Major General.  The majority of officers are of 
the rank of Major and below and hold various staff positions 
throughout the command, with exceptions for company commands and 
the Director, DI School.    
Commanding Officers, RTBN CO’s, RTR, H&SBN, 
WFTBN, CG. MCRDSD, are selected and slated via a highly 
competitive command screening process held annually at HQMC.  
Only a select few at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and above 
are screened for command and subsequently slated for a command 
billet.  This is testament to the quality of commanding officer 
within the ranks of MCRDSD. 
The enlisted men, women, and officers of MCRDSD 
are the right people for the tasks and missions for which they 
are assigned.  They arrive in possession of the raw skills and 
capabilities (KSAs) required in order for the depot to be 
successful in the transformation of recruits into Marines.  
Their varied background, MOSs, ethnicity, rank, etc. add to 
their value as instructors, supervisors and staff in the recruit 
training process.  The system, though sensitive to political 
pressures, demanding and rigid, is simple and rudimentary in 
nature.  Other than the specifics related to the POI, SOP, and 
DI school for prospective DIs, no new real skills are required 
to be learned in order to be successful.  As stated earlier by 
the RTR Commander, “The beauty of this place is it’s basic 
Marine Corps leadership”.  And there in lies the lasting value 
to having conducted a tour aboard MCRDSD.  The leadership skills 
honed here are in turn, rotated back to the Operating Forces in 
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terms of more capable and professional officer and enlisted 
Marines. 
d. Processes and Subsystems 
1.  Human Resources Management. MCRDSD does not 
have a formal human resources function by title or office, but 
the inherent processes of selection, training and rewards are 
formalized and imbedded in existing structure.  The selection 
process, as discussed earlier is executed externally between the 
Marine and his or her MOS monitor.  It is up to this system to 
ensure the depot receives the right people, at the right time, 
with the right skills.  Distribution and accountability of 
officer and enlisted personnel once aboard the depot occurs 
within the G-1 offices located in Depot Headquarters. 
The training system aboard the depot is seen as 
one of the core competencies of MCRDSD and accordingly is a top 
priority.  There are three training pipelines conducted aboard 
the Depot.  The primary training process is in accordance with 
its mission of making basic trained Marines.  The recruit 
training process is a highly scrutinized, rigid, and detailed 
training regimen that produces arguably the best war fighters in 
this nation.  The current POI is highly evolved and more than 
adequate.  Arguably, due to timeline restrictions regarding 
submission of swim qualification codes, priority of PRASP79, 
logistical constraints regarding WFTBN, etc., the POI could be 
altered for the better.  How so remains a matter of opinion and 
ample fodder for discussion. 
Currently, the training phases are broken down, 
by week: Phase I, 6 weeks, Phase II, 4 weeks, and Phase III, 2 
                                                 
79 PRASP, Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program, whereby, new Marines are 
temporarily assigned to a Recruiting Station near their home of record to 
assist in the recruiting effort for a period of up to 30 days. 
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weeks.  This places a constraint on recruit trainers to 
accomplish ample required training prior to graduation; the 
final PFT, final uniform fittings, the Battalion Commanders 
Inspection, and the final practical examination, most notably.  
Of these, the most significantly impacted is the final PFT.  
Recruits often return from CPEN injured and not capable of 
conducting physical fitness training over the last 2 weeks.  
This results in often as many as 100 recruits receiving waivers 
and not having to run the final PFT80.  Adjustments to the 
current training schedule, i.e. the POI, need to be considered 
to allow recruit trainers maximize their efforts and the quality 
of their product, vice the current “mad-dash” to graduation. 
The other two training pipelines aboard the 
depot, the DI course and SOC, are conducted at the DI School and 
instructed by DI School officers and staff. These were discussed 
at length earlier in key success factors (see Key Success 
factors, B-2).  Both the DI course and SOC are seen as the crux 
of success in support of the Depot’s primary mission of making 
Marines.  And as such, the command pays strict attention to the 
resourcing and POIs of these two programs.  The training is 
adequate in both instances and contributes directly and 
significantly to the quality of the product that crosses the 
parade deck each graduation morning.  
Follow-on training is conducted.  Upon completion 
of the DI course or SOC, the Marine will report his unit for 
assignment to a platoon or series.  The quality of the 
supervision, instruction and introduction into his new 
environment he receives will be instrumental in his success as a 
recruit trainer.  This initial period is referred to as OJT, or 
on the job training.  New DIs and series officers must 
                                                 
80Anonymous Interview  
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demonstrate a basic knowledge of, and proficiency in, recruit 
training prior to being signed off by either their Senior DI or 
Company Commander as being fully qualified to train and 
supervise recruits.  This initial time is important in providing 
for the welfare, integrity and maintenance of the high standards 
associated with Marine Corps recruit training. 
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The rewards process, or what is recognized for 
success at MCRDSD, presents an interesting perspective on the 
recruit training environment.  Formally, rewards are given in 
the form of Navy Achievement or Navy Commendation medals to 
individuals who complete a successful tour.  And due to the 
stress, rigors, and sensitivity inherent to the recruit training 
environment, this generally refers to any individual who 
succeeds by not failing.   An example, regardless of the 
performance of a particular platoon, series or company in any 
particular event or throughout the training cycle as a whole, is 
whether or not that unit was the subject of any administrative 
action that resulted in an investigation or the relief of a DI.  
To a fault, those at the lowest level of recruit training 
defined success as finishing a cycle with those you started 
with.  In addition, they felt that “staying off the skyline” or 
having no allegations was typical of a rewarding cycle or tour.  
This presents an interesting paradox.  Those responsible for 
executing the recruit training process, where the environment is 
the most tenuous, and of whom the most is asked, are not 
rewarded based upon the quality of the product they put across 
the parade deck from cycle to cycle, but in turn are punished 
for any misgivings or mistakes they make in the process.  It’s 
an environment where “one ah’ sh**” can wipe away all your 
“atta’ boys” in a heartbeat.  It should be noted that the 
command has issued guidance that honest mistakes, 
understandably, will occur, and may even be forgiven, but cannot 
be repeated.  Also, as one senior enlisted wisely warned, “be 
careful what you call an honest mistake”81. 
2.  Measurement and Controls.  The bottom line to 
the organizational performance of MCRDSD is measured by whether 
or not they meet the needs of the Operating Forces in accordance 
with the Commandant’s guidance.  Personal performance is 
measured primarily by fitness reports that are not necessarily 
an accurate measure of productivity.   Other means of 
measurement evolve around recruit training statistics measured 
in percentages.  Both RTR and Depot track several statistics 
that indicate key trends in recruit training analysis.  
Important among them is the percent of originals graduated82 and 
percent injuries by body part and training event83.  Tracking 
and analysis of these figures allows policy makers to adjust the 
recruit training program accordingly. 
MCRDSD personnel have many controls imposed upon 
them by higher, primarily, the POI, which is authored at TECOM 
on the east coast.  This, as previously mentioned, must be 
strictly adhered to and any deviations from which are not looked 
upon favorably.  In addition, they must work within existing 
guidelines, policies, rules and regulations that act as system 
constraints.   Most notably is the SOP.  The SOP, referred to as 
the “bible” of recruit training strictly prescribes the conduct 
of all personnel involved in the recruit training process, 
whether directly or indirectly.  
                                                 
81 Anonymous Interview 
82 Percent of originals graduated is the number of recruits graduated that 
were original platoon members. This      number discounts any new recruits 
adjoined from other units or picked up from PCP, MRP, etc.   
83 By tracking injuries per extremity and event, training could be 
adjusted to alleviate the frequency of injuries to recruits 
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3.  Planning, Communication, and Information 
Management.  Long-range planning for the most part is limited to 
monitoring, forecasting, and making any necessary adjustments to 
the long-range recruiting and recruit training plans 
disseminated by MCRC and TECOM.  These plans generally consist 
of forecasted enlisted contracts, tentative ship dates from MEPS 
to MCRDSD, assignment to recruit training company’s for pick-up 
and subsequent training.  Planning also accounts for follow-on 
training dates at MCT and SOI.  Forecasting has been 
historically fairly accurate, and when, as is often necessary, 
is capable of flexibility in response to changes in the 
recruiting environment and retention. 
The majority of short-term planning done on the 
Depot revolves around tweaking the training schedule to allow 
for civilian tours, media tours, conduct of burials, and 
conditions brought on by foul weather.  The former are often 
causes of “leap-ex’s”84 at the battalion and company levels, as 
it is often their personnel, DIs primarily, that are called upon 
to lead the tour at the expense of recruit training.   Beyond 
these considerations, planning is minimal and doesn’t much 
extend beyond final coordination measures by the training unit. 
Communication at all levels of command aboard the 
depot is vital to the success of the recruit training mission.  
MCRDSD relies on a variety of communication mediums for planning 
and coordination.  E-mail, the internet, Depot intra-net, 
multiple phone lines, and fax capabilities facilitate the Depot 
mission at all levels.  Like other commands, the internet and e-
mail have become pervasive, however, the primary means of 
communication, and the most preferred, remains face-to face, 
                                                 
84 “Leap-ex” is the term given to a task received at the last moment that 
causes the personnel, planning and training resources of the assigned unit 
to become momentarily strained in order to accomplish the assigned task.   
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followed by phone conversations and then e-mail.  The only 
exception to this rule is communication to WFTBN, separated by 
more than 30 miles, where coordination can be difficult, and 
primary means remain the phone line and e-mail.  Periodic 
meetings are also held to facilitate communication between 
commands.  An example would be a weekly battalion commanders and 
staff meeting.   
There were no acknowledged problems, or short-comings, 
in the Depots current information management system.  The most 
recent improvement in information management aboard the Depot is 
the advent of RAS/PAS.  RAS/PAS is a multi-function, personnel 
accountability system and database.  It improves the generating 
and sharing of information Depot wide.  Currently, computer 
desktops are located in DI huts at the platoon level.  RAS/PAS 
facilitates the ease of maintaining accurate recruit record 
books by platoon, series and company staff, by automating the 
recruit-entry system.  Whereas in the recent past DIs had to 
hand-write all entries into the recruit record books, they and 
company staff can now cut and paste off a menu of options, edit 
past entries, and ensure consistency and accuracy amongst the DI 
team in future entries.  RAS/PAS also allows for the submission 
of morning reports and the transfer of recruit information from 
one unit to another electronically, vice having to hand carry a 
book or books.  RAS/PAS also facilitates the commands ability to 
manage the training curriculum, and maintain a shared, 
statistical database, which allows the commands to generate 
long-term trend statistics, such as event scores and averages, 
graduation percentages and recruit drops.  RAS/PAS is also 
interfaced with other data bases, most notably MCTFS, the Marine 




The culture aboard MCRDSD can best be described by dividing 
it into three sub-cultures: the personal and professional 
conduct of Depot personnel; the overall culture of recruit 
training; and Drill Instructors.  The Marine Corps’ overarching 
culture of pride sums up the professional conduct and appearance 
of all Depot personnel, active duty military and otherwise.  
MCRDs are traditionally the epitome of professionalism in the 
services and MCRDSD is no exception.  MCRDSD personnel 
understand they are part of a showcase and that they are on 
exhibit to the public at all times.  It is this mentality that 
reinforces the highest professional standards of any base in the 
Marine Corps. 
The Marine Corps recruit training culture, i.e., “We don’t 
promise you a rose garden”, is the toughest entry-level training 
of all the services and its preservation is critical to the 
future of the Corps.  When other services got easier, the Marine 
Corps got tougher.  They incorporated combat hitting skills, 
then Line Integrated Neuro-over ride Engagement (L. I. N. E.), 
and now Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (M. C. M. A. P.).  
They added an extra week of training to already the longest 
recruit training in the services and implemented the Crucible, a 
grueling 54-hour “gut-check”.  When other services decided to go 
co-educational and combine males and females into one training 
pipeline, the Marine Corps retained and defended its policy of 
progressive integration of females into a historical and 
predominantly male fighting force.  The logic is based on the 
premise that young people, male and female, perform better when 
they learn first how to be Marines, then gradually learn how to 
work well with other gender Marines. Recruits arrive aboard 
MCRDSD understanding they are about to begin the toughest 
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recruit training in the services.  When you ask them “why the 
Marines?”  They respond, “because they’re the toughest, sir.” 
The culture of the DIs is a source of pride in the conduct 
of their duties.  To begin, there is no billet in the services, 
which by mere presence alone exudes nearly the level of pride 
than does that of a Marine Corps Drill Instructor.  By donning 
the “smokey”, the revered cover of the DI, a Marine becomes part 
and parcel to a very special part of Marine Corps history.  They 
adopt a legacy of the very highest standards of conduct and 
assume the awesome responsibility of creating Marines out of 
civilians and teamwork out of individuals.  Marine Corps DIs are 
readily recognized as the best recruit trainers of all the 
services.  This legacy of pride, honor and personal dignity are 
visible cultural norms, and are the driving forces behind the 
results they consistently achieve.  
6. Outputs and Outcomes 
MCRDSD has one customer specific output regarding recruit 
training.  For the Operating Forces, that output is producing 
approximately 20 thousand basic trained Marines annually.  While 
providing Marines to the fleet is a concrete, measurable output, 
there are other less tangible, more difficult to measure 
outputs, which result from the recruit training process.  For 
example, the conversion of individual strangers into cohesive 
units, drastic improvements in physical fitness, neatness, 
organization skills, and marksmanship are examples of typical 
outputs.  Consequences of these outputs includes a new-found 
professionalism and personal confidence, job satisfaction, and 
increased retention and reenlistment rates. 
Serving the Operating Forces results in the following 
outcomes:  increased fleet and combat readiness of the operating 
forces positively impacts national security and accomplishment 
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of America’s objectives worldwide.  Providing the operational 
forces with basic trained Marines is critical in order for these 
units to maintain required manning levels to meet mission 
requirements.  As mentioned earlier, a transformed individual 
with the physical and mental confidence to succeed is a positive 
contribution to society.  It is not a stretch to say that 
recruit training provides thousands of young people with the 
basic knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to succeed 
throughout their entire lives. 
C. MINTZBERG MODEL 
When defining the interrelationships and core attributes of 
MCRDSD, its configuration, as defined by Mintzberg, is that of 
the machine organization.  It is an organization where the basic 
structure has highly specialized, routine operating tasks; very 
formalized communication throughout the organization; large-size  
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Figure 12. MCRDSD Mintzberg Model85 
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85 Adaptation of Mintzberg Configuration Model, Mintzberg, 1989. 
operating units; reliance on the functional basis for grouping 
tasks; relatively centralized power for decision making; and an 
administrative structure with a distinction between line and 
staff.86 
An analysis of the MCRDSD organization via the Mintzberg 
model yields the following (see figure 12).  The operating core 
and techno-structure are adequate in size and operating 
capacity.  The supporting functions are not in alignment, or in 
congruence with the middle line.  They are too influential in 
purpose and task and overlap the mission and responsibilities of 
the middle line and operating core.  These supporting commands 
provide critical instruction and support to the mission of 
making Marines, but overarching cognizance over these functions 
resides outside the middle line.  This causes an overlap in the 
configuration between the supporting functions and line 
commands.  This is cause for concern as it can lead to ambiguity 
in direction and guidance for those in the operating core who 
must discern who’s “turf” they are on today.  Further, this 
disconnect can give rise to friction in the assignment or 
allocation of resources.  The strategic apex may be strained due 
to multiple responsibilities of Commanding General. 
Both the systems model and the configuration model are 
effective tools for analyzing MCRDSD in that each looks at the 
organization as a whole, including external factors that may 
impact the system internally.  These models applied to MCRDSD 
show an organization that appears extremely efficient in the 
production of Marines.  There are indications that are explained 
in the next chapter that the organizational structure, primary 
training pipeline, and DI subculture may not be optimized.  
Coupled with increasing and changing demands from the external 
                                                 
86 Mintzberg, 1989. 
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environment and geographic constraints, MCRDSD, indeed all 
defense organizations, must continually assess their actions in 
terms of producing desired results.  The question is always, in 
what ways can the recruit training process be improved. 
The models provide a useful framework in which to view the 
system and its components in relation to one another in terms of 
congruence or fit, i.e., to what extent is MCRDSD as a whole 
tending towards equilibrium, i.e., are the parts more compatible 
than not?  The next chapter draws conclusions around this 
hypothesis and offers recommendations for improving recruit 
training. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Systems analysis and Mintzberg’s configuration theory were 
used in this thesis to describe and analyze the Marine Corps 
Recruit Depot, San Diego organization.  Results of the analysis 
in the previous chapter indicate that although MCRDSD 
accomplishes its basic mission, key variables are incongruent.  
When important aspects of any organization are out of alignment, 
optimum performance is not occurring. Describing Key factors and 
how they interrelate is an important first step for leaders and 
policy makers.  The purpose of this comparison to theoretical 
models is to identify where to intervene in the recruit depot to 
improve overall results. 
Though MCRDSD is successful in terms of mission 
accomplishment and goal attainment, every organization must 
continually examine itself and seek change where it is needed.  
For MCRDSD, changes to the current organizational structure, 
culture, direction and recruit training process offer the 
opportunity for improvement. The conclusions and recommendations 
offered here are not meant to be conclusive, but to begin 
dialogue among Marine Corps leadership and policy makers towards 
implementing change and improving MCRDSD performance. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to mention the limitations of this study 
prior to discussing any conclusions in order that they are 
understood in their proper context.  Conducting an in-depth 
organizational analysis of MCRDSD requires expertise, a 
knowledge base, experience level and time that exceed the scope 
of this thesis.  One week aboard MCRDSD learning about the 
organization, conducting 30 interviews, and limited archival 
information does not constitute a thorough organizational 
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assessment.  This thesis is a preliminary assessment of MCRDSD 
to provide Depot leadership a rudimentary understanding of areas 
within the organization that may benefit from change. 
The following conclusions are offered: 
• Key external and internal organizational variables are 
incongruent, i.e., not aligned for optimal performance.  
Structurally, the Commanding general appears to be spread too 
thin and over tasked making it difficult for adequate attention 
to be paid to competing and emergent priorities.  An additional 
structural and decision-making finding is that the Recruit 
Training Regiment has overall responsibility for the 
transformation of civilians to Marines per their mission 
statement, but it does not have cognizance of one-third of the 
recruit training process, nor of outside agencies integral to 
mission accomplishment.  This command structure creates an 
unnecessary duality within the organization, consequently ending 
to potential and actual friction, and turf issues.  Subordinate 
commanders must often answer to two different commands which may 
detract from clear lines of command and control.  Further, 
argument for a command, whose mission is subordinate to RTRs, to 
remain on par with RTR, is equal to subordinating the overall 
mission as a matter of convenience for the supporting command. 
• Origination and cognizance over the Program of 
Instruction (POI) is held at too high a level and is too rigid, 
leading towards increased cycle time in implementing change.  
The Depot’s limited authority over the POI and its lack of 
flexibility in implementing change were clearly indicated.  
Requests for changes to the POI require a long turn-around time 
and are subject to the authority of staff planners located in 
Quantico, VA, on the opposite coast from the executing command.  
This unwieldy separation of planners from executors is clearly 
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documented in the research literature as the “fallacy of 
detachment”87.  Results include an unnecessary consumption of 
time and effort on behalf of the recruit trainers and command 
staff to the point where several had words to the effect: “it’s 
not a battle worth fighting.”88 
• Systems analysis indicates that the recruit training 
schedule, or Program of Instruction (POI), is currently not 
optimized towards producing the highest quality basic trained 
Marine.  The current training schedule is weighted too heavily 
in the last two weeks of training, I.e., battalion commanders 
inspection, final uniform fittings, final physical fitness test, 
final drill competition, final academics testing and preparation 
for graduation.  This places unnecessary time constraints on 
recruit trainers and supporting agencies in the accomplishment 
of multiple graduation requirements.  Further, it does not give 
ample opportunity for recruits to physically recover from the 
conduct of the Crucible prior to the final PFT, perhaps 
compromising the quality of the final product. 
• The Depot priority of making Marines as espoused by 
Depot leadership, is at times not in concert with, and in 
conflict with perceived and actual priorities.  The emphasis on 
public relations and its related taskings upon Recruit Training 
Battalions diverts valuable recruit training personnel from 
their mission and often places undue hardship on strained 
resources at the battalion level, e.g. tours.  Many recruit 
trainers indicated that this factor subordinates the training 
mission to public relations, thereby adversely impacting desired 
results. 
                                                 
87 Mintzberg, 1989 
88 Anonymous Interview 
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• An aspect of culture among recruit trainers is 
incongruent with the desired culture of making high-quality, 
basic trained Marines.  Culture in systems analysis is an 
emergent variable, i.e., actual behaviors, norms, and language 
resulting form the (mis)fit of key input and throughput 
variables.  An emerging culture can be subtle and can become 
deeply ingrained and difficult to change.  Data were fairly 
convincing.  The notion is as long as recruits cross the parade 
deck and no recruit training violations have occurred, than a 
successful training cycle has been completed.  There is 
insufficient attention paid to the quality of training 
completed, and focused attention paid to keeping production on-
track.  Training to the lowest standard can become a defacto 
standard in a production-line mentality.  This is a slippery 
slope fraught with controversy and varying interpretations.  The 
notion that the Depot is more of a pump than a filter was echoed 
by experienced recruit trainers.  Too much emphasis is placed on 
the word “basic” in producing the basic trained Marine.  The 
intent is to stimulate further analysis of this difficult 
concept and to ensure that appropriate interventions occur to 
produce consistent results over time. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations address the fore-mentioned 
conclusions. 
• Assign a Deputy Commanding General billet to the Depot 
staff. The current depot-level command structure of MCRDSD, 
though congruent, is not optimized towards mission 
accomplishment. Currently, the Commanding General of MCRDSD 
presides over major and multiple responsibilities that fragments 
his ability to focus on recruiting.  Quite simply, he is over-
tasked.  The creation and manning of a Deputy Commanding General 
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billet would alleviate a centralized command decision-making 
process and increase efficiency aboard the Depot.  The relative 
scope, breadth of responsibility, and specific tasks of this 
billet would be assigned by the CG of MCRDSD as deemed 
necessary.  Oversight of the POI at the Depot is an example of a 
specific tasking. 
• Restructure Recruit Training Regiment to include 
Weapons and Field Training Battalion and Clothing Detachment.  
The current organizational structure of subordinate units is not 
in alignment with assigned tasks and mission accomplishment.  
Re-designating WFTBN for command by a Lieutenant Colonel (0-5) 
and placing it within RTR would provide continuity of command 
throughout the recruit training process and “continuity equates 
to credibility”89.  This would facilitate communication, 
information flow, implementation of policy, logistics, save 
money, etc., which all contribute to enhanced proficiency and 
efficiency.  Assign the RTR Commander the collateral duty of 
Area-31 Commander with the WFTBN Commander possessing ByDir90 
authority.  Further, it would be worth studying the feasibility 
of placing the Clothing Issue Detachment within the RTR S-4.  
This would provide RTR Commander and his staff with oversight of 
the uniform issue, and increase flexibility, responsiveness and 
command influence over this important supporting function. 
• Restructure accountability and responsibility of 
the Program of Instruction to the Depot level.  Cognizance over 
the Program of Instruction (POI) should reside with the command 
that presides over its execution, should the command be capable.  
MCRDSD possesses the senior command, expertise, experience base 
                                                 
89 Anonymous Interview 
90 ByDir stands for By Direction.  This is a degree of authority to allow a subordinate commander to act in 
place of his immediate superior. 
 85
and professional competence to oversee, author and implement its 
own POI in accordance with TECOM’s guidance.  This would provide 
the depot the capability to be responsive to innovative training 
ideas and special circumstances unique to MCRDSD, i.e., 
geographic separation of WFTBN from the Depot. 
• Reorganize the current recruit training schedule 
to three phases, four-weeks each phase.  By allowing for four 
weeks of training following the Crucible, recruits would have 
the opportunity to realize their maximum potential and complete 
training physically qualified to progress to School of Infantry 
or Marine Combat Training.  And, recruit trainers would have the 
time and opportunity to ensure recruits graduated fully 
qualified.  This would have no impact upon training conducted at 
WFTBN as their four weeks of instruction would remain intact.  
There would need to be a shift of instruction between the first 
and last four weeks of instruction dealing with academics and 
physical conditioning.  Swim week would be conducted week four 
so as not to interrupt the requirement of assigning codes for 
Permissive Recruiter Assistance Program  
• Shift responsibility for the conduct of all non-
training related taskers to the Depot.  Place primary 
responsibility for the conduct and manning of depot tours and 
other public relations taskers with Depot staff and personnel, 
i.e., exclude RTR from having to provide manpower for the 
conduct of these tours.  Recruit training is the priority 
activity aboard the Depot and the execution of these tours, 
though important, negatively impacts directly at the recruit 
training level. 
• Revamp/enhance the reward/recognition system for 
Drill Instructor performance.  Institute an informal Depot and 
RTR level award for the recognition of enlisted recruit trainers 
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for individual, platoon, and series performance.  Informal 
rewards in the form of the “Big Dawg” award, i.e., Lt. General 
Klimp91, are unique and demonstrate command interest, recognition 
and appreciation for enlisted recruit trainers special efforts.  
Enlisted recruit trainers are any enlisted Marine or Navy 
personnel involved in the recruit training process to include 
AIs, Range Coaches, and Corpsmen.  Informal recognition such as 
this is invaluable in increasing individual and unit morale and 
in improving upon the senior officer to junior enlisted command 
relationship. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study looked at MCRDSD in its current context without 
exploring alternatives to its current physical disposition.  The 
following area is proposed for further research. 
• Conduct an Activity Cost Based analysis of the 
consolidation of recruit training aboard Camp Pendleton.  MCRDSD 
is not quite the ideal location nor does it provide all the 
requisite structure and facilities for a consolidated recruit 
training effort.  However, Camp Pendleton to the north does.  
There is little question of the benefits that consolidated 
recruit training would bring, saved resources, simplified 
logistics, proximity to SOI and MCT, and I MEF.  However, the 
initial cost in doing so would be significant.   
The Marine Corps would benefit from a study that would 
quantify the cost of consolidation of recruit training aboard 
Camp Pendleton to the Marine Corps, the economic impact upon the 
two communities, the impact upon the quality of life of DIs, and 
                                                 
91 Lt. Gen. Klimp’s Big-Dawg Award.  Lt. General Klimp, CG, MCRDPI, ’93-’96, would personally appear in 
the conduct of training events to present to an individual recognized by his chain of command as having gone 
above and beyond, a large plaque with a pen and ink drawing of the Marine Corps mascot, a bulldog along with a 
personal inscription denoting the Marines performance.  These awards were highly regarded and proudly displayed.  
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the environmental impact upon Camp Pendleton.  This would 
constitute a significant investment and require perhaps multiple 
efforts, but could yield benefits in terms of cost savings and 
increased combat readiness.  
D. A FINAL WORD 
This study provides Depot leadership with recommendations 
for change within their organization, including an objective 
perspective of the DIs view of the world.  These recommendations 
are not made lightly, and the steps necessary for their 
implementation and possible ramifications were considered.  Some 
of the recommendations would obviously require a significant 
effort to implement and approval would be dependent upon higher 
authority within and external to the Marine Corps.  However, 
other recommendations are well within the authority of Depot 
leadership to enact and their impact would be easily discernable 
as advantageous to the functioning of the Depot.  Lastly, 
recommendations regarding the re-structuring of RTR would 
require the bolstering of the RTR S-3 and S-4 shops with 
additional staff personnel.   
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego is an outstanding 
organization whose contributions to the Marine Corps and the 
country cannot be overstated.  It is this along with my three 
years of recruit training experience that provided the 
inspiration to analyze an aspect of recruit training.  It is my 
hope that the work done here will contribute to the ongoing 
effort of improving upon this important process. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
This interview is being conducted as part of the research 
for my master’s thesis.  I am conducting an organizational 
analysis of MCRD, San Diego using the systems model.  The 
primary purpose on my research is to analyze the structure, 
processes, information systems, and both internal and external 
relationships of MCRD, San Diego. 
 The results of this interview will be used in 
explaining how this organization works and if it is 
organizationally optimized towards its goals.  Anything said in 
this interview will be kept confidential.  I will need to record 
this interview for accuracy sake. 
Background 
1.  Briefly, what is your background? 
2.  How long have you been in this position? 
 
Inputs 
3.  What would you say is the overall purpose of MCRDSD?  
4.  Can you describe for me your units external environment 
(Political, Economic, social and Technological)? 
5.  What would say are the inputs to MCRDSD (unit specific) in 
terms of information and resources? 
6.  What do you believe to be the key success factors for your 
unit (efficient, effective, collaborative)? 
7.  Briefly describe your goals for your unit (vision, values, 
mission)? 
8.  What is your strategy/approach in attaining your goals?   
 
Design Factors    
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9.  What are your primary responsibilities?  Which are the most 
important ones?  Which do you spend the most time on? 
10.  How do you spend the majority of your time in a typical 
day?  
11.  How long do you estimate does it take to become effective 
at this job? 
12.  What would you change about your job as it currently 
stands?  
13.  Is the current organizational structure consistent with 
mission accomplishment? 
14.  What individuals or organizations have an impact on you 
getting your job done? 
15.  What types of constraints/restraints do you face in the 
conduct of your job? 
16.  How would you describe your work environment? 
17.  Do peer or subordinate agencies/units work together in a 
manner consistent with the depots mission and goals? 
18.  How do you communicate with your superiors, peers and 
subordinates?  Which is the most effective?  Which is the most 
efficient?  
19.  What are the information systems used by this organization?  
Are you able to get the information you need in a timely manner 
to make decisions?  What information would you like to have you 
currently aren’t getting? 
20.  Is the current communication technology/infrastructure 
adequate in order to do your job? Please describe any 
shortfalls. 
21.  Briefly describe the people who work for you?  Can you 
describe their knowledge, skills, and abilities? 
22.  Are the right type of people be recruited and selected?  
How do you train and develop those who work here? 
23.  Are the current training methods used in preparing those 
who work here adequate? 
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24.  What specific training have you received for this job?  Do 
you feel that training was adequate? 
25.  How is success measured here (unit/individual)?  Is it a 
desired pattern of behavior that’s rewarded? 
26.  How are people held accountable?  Do the current methods of 
accountability produce the desired patterns of behavior?   
 
Culture 
27.  Can you define the culture of your organization?  Is it 
consistent with the mission precedence?  Does it instigate or 
mitigate conflict between peer/subordinate units? 
28.  How is conflict managed? 
 
Outputs 
29.  What would say are the outputs of MCRDSD? 
30.  Who or what organizations depend upon these outputs?  
31.  How are the outputs measured? 
32.  What are the indicators of performance? 
 
Outcomes 
33.  What are the reasons for the commands successes/ failures? 
 
Miscellaneous 
34.  If you were CG for a day and could change three things in 
this organization, what would they be? 
35.  Is there anything you can think of that I should be asking 
in order for me to better understand this organization? 
36.  Do you have anything else you’d like to add?  
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APPENDIX C. RECRUIT TRAINING CALENDAR 
Week 1  
Introduction to Physical Training Introduction to Core Values 
Intro to the M-l6A2 Service Rifle 
Circuit Course  
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program  
Week 2  
Strength & Endurance Course 
Obstacle Course 
Bayonet Training 
First Aid classes  
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
Core Values classes  
Academic classes  
Physical Training  
Week 3  
Log Drills 
Core Values classes  
First Aid classes  
Senior Drill Instructor Inspection Confidence Course  
Academic classes  
Physical Training 
Initial Drill Evaluation  
Week 4  
Marine Corps Martial Arts Program 
Pugil Sticks 
Log Drills 
Museum Tour  
Academic classes  
Series Officer Inspection  
Week 5  
Swim Week 




Start of Team Week  
Marine Corps Martial Arts  
Program Test  
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Week 6  
Team Week 
Move to WFTBN  
Week 7  
Marksmanship Training 
5 Mile Hike 
Core Values 
Physical Training  
Week 8  
Marksmanship Qualification 
8-Mile Hike 
Physical Training  
Week 9  
Field Training  
Confidence (Gas) Chamber 
Field Firing 
Beach Run  
Week 10  
Company Commander's Inspection  
The Crucible  
Tan Belt Presentation  
Warrior's Breakfast 
Family of the Corps Presentation 
Equipment Inspection 
Movement back to MCRD  
Week 11  
Final Uniform Fit 
Practical Examination  
Physical Fitness Test 
Rappelling  
Week 12  
Battalion Commander’s Inspection 
Final Drill Evaluation  
Motivation Run  
Emblem Ceremony 
Family Day and Recruit Liberty  
Graduation 
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